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There has been a great deal of interest in health and social care
devolution in Greater Manchester, and what others could learn
from this experiment.  This report presents ﬁndings from
research commissioned and funded by The Health Foundation
and the NIHR CLAHRC for Greater Manchester, which set out to
understand how health and social care devolution policy
developed, what changes it brought to governance,
accountability and organisational arrangements, and how
changes to health and care services for people were planned and
implemented.  The research involved both qualitative and
quantitative methods and our approach is detailed in Appendix
A.   This report largely presents ﬁndings from our qualitative
research, and the main results of our quantitative analysis will be
reported in 2019. The research team was granted access to
observe meetings, interview key participants, and collate and
analyse documents from December 2015 until October 2017.
We are very grateful to all those involved in devolution who took
part in our research.
Our key ﬁndings are:
• There has been much rhetoric about the beneﬁts and
possibilities of health and social care devolution, particularly
at the outset when the devolution deal was ﬁrst struck
between national and local politicians and system leaders.
There is a strong political and emotional appeal for many 
people in the idea that decisions about health and social care 
in Greater Manchester should be made in the city-region, 
rather than in London.
• We describe the health and social care reforms in Greater
Manchester as “soft devolution” because unlike most
devolution reforms, they have no statutory basis. They are,
essentially, an agreement for administrative delegation
between the Department of Health and Social Care, national
bodies like NHS England and NHS Improvement, and 
NHS organisations and local authorities and others in 
Greater Manchester.
• Most of the policy agenda that is being pursued in Greater
Manchester reﬂects closely the national priorities of the
government and the Department of Health and Social Care, 
and the NHS mandate and priorities and planning guidance 
of NHS England.  In that sense, devolution has not been an
exercise in allowing local autonomy or control over policy, 
but over its implementation.  However, some would argue 
that implementation has been distinctively diﬀerent, in
governance and philosophy, reﬂecting the particular history 
of collaboration in Greater Manchester.
In February 2015, Greater Manchester secured an agreement with the government
to take what was described as “devolved control” of the £6 billion pa budget for health
and social care for the 2.8 million people of the city-region.  The aim was to improve
health outcomes and reduce health inequalities both within Greater Manchester and
between Greater Manchester and other areas of England, and to address a growing
gap between need and demand for health and social care and available resources to
provide them.  A new Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership was
established, bringing together NHS organisations, local authorities and other
stakeholders in health and social care in the city-region.  These changes have taken
place in the context of a wider devolution deal for Greater Manchester, and a growing
interest nationally in devolution and regional governance in England.
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• Other approaches to achieving these same policy objectives
have evolved in the rest of England, including the Vanguard
programme, Sustainability and Transformation
Plans/Partnerships and latterly Integrated Care Systems.
Arguably, the GM Partnership has prototyped or pioneered
some changes now being picked up more widely in England,
but it is hard to be sure what is the distinctive or additional
contribution of  devolution.
• There is near complete consensus among stakeholders in
Greater Manchester and, we think, more broadly, that the
move towards more local or regional, place-based governance
in health and social care in England makes sense.  There is also
near universal support for the idea that greater integration of
healthcare services and of health and social care is needed.
However, evidence from elsewhere suggests we should be
cautious about claims that such reforms will bring about
transformations in population health, service performance or
uptake, or eﬃciency and costs.  
• The GM Partnership has assumed some of the behaviours of a
statutory body and some have observed that its leadership
acts at times like the strategic health authorities which existed
before they were abolished in 2012. However, the reality is that
this form of soft devolution has its limits, and the GM
Partnership has few formal levers to use over NHS
organisations, and even fewer in relation to local authorities.
Individual organisations continue, understandably, to guard
their autonomy carefully and to act in ways that, overtly or
covertly, serve organisational self-interest.
• The GM Partnership has invested heavily in building
relationships among those health and care organisations which
make up its membership, and developing shared governance
arrangements and decision making processes which are
intended to promote and sustain a collective narrative of
managed consensus.  However, it is diﬃcult to tell how secure
those arrangements are, and they have not yet really been
severely stress tested.
• The GM Partnership has consciously sought to take a more
transformational approach, embracing complexity and tackling
reconﬁguration across the system as a whole – in primary and
community care, most areas of acute care, mental health and
other services concurrently. This is an ambitious strategy – if it
works, it will achieve large-scale change much more rapidly, but
if it does not, it will have been a very time-consuming and
expensive exercise. It is still too early to tell.
• Those transformation plans make some  optimistic
assumptions about the rates at which planned changes will
lead to shifts in demand for health and social care, and in
patterns of service usage, which will result in eﬃciencies and
savings. The aspirations which lie behind many of those plans
to provide services which are, for example, better coordinated,
closer to people’s homes, more targeted on need, and aimed
at preventing health problems or managing them more
proactively are admirable. But our quantitative analysis and
research and experience elsewhere suggest that such changes
may improve care, but will probably not save money.
• Since the launch of devolution, much eﬀort has been
expended in establishing relationships, setting up governance
arrangements, and producing and agreeing strategies and
plans, and the focus has only more recently shifted toward
implementation and changes that service users and the public
would notice.   The GM Partnership has set out a wide range of
changes it attributes to devolution, Many of those examples of
course predate the devolution reforms, some represent recent
transformation fund investments, and some are still in their
very early stages. Those involved, especially at the outset, 
may have overpromised what devolution would achieve or the
timescale in which changes would happen. We think this is well
recognised by the GM Partnership’s leadership which is now
strongly focused on implementation. 
Overall, health and social care devolution in Greater Manchester
is in transition, and some of those involved would argue that it is
still too early to assess the progress or impact of this initiative.  It
does not seem, at this point, as if other areas are likely to embark on
health and social care devolution following the Greater Manchester
model, though as we have noted some quite similar reforms
particularly to the organisation of the NHS are being pursued
elsewhere.   At some point, not just for Greater Manchester, a
new legislative settlement seems inevitable, to close the gap
between statutory legal position and the facts on the ground, and
to formalise these new forms of governance and accountability.
That new legislative settlement could pave the way to reform the
decades long centralisation at a national level of healthcare policy
and NHS provision in ways that create greater regional or local
governance, but which might also lead to greater variations in
service provision.  It could also tackle the longstanding
separation of funding arrangements and entitlements for
healthcare and for social care in ways that promote integration
and reduce barriers to access, though this would probably
increase overall costs and require more funding.
Executive summary
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Introduction1
In February 2015, Greater Manchester secured an agreement with the government
to take what was described as “devolved control” of the £6 billion pa budget for health
and social care for the 2.8 million people of the city-region. This agreement was
signed by the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities, NHS England and
Greater Manchester clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) and included letters 
of support from Greater Manchester NHS trusts, foundation trusts and the 
NW Ambulance Service. This report presents ﬁndings from research which 
has sought to understand how health and social care devolution has worked.  
This introductory chapter sets out our research aims and explains the structure 
of the report.
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The Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership has
articulated from the outset a highly ambitious vision for health
and social care in Greater Manchester, with a strong emphasis on
diﬀerentiating devolution from past reforms and reform
elsewhere in England. The underlying logic model of devolution
appears to rely heavily on the idea that the eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency of the health and social care system requires
wholesale transformation as opposed to incremental change. It
is predicated on the need for improvements in prevention and
self-care, better organised primary and community care,
demand management, health and social care integration, and
standardised acute, specialist and support services. 
These ideas reﬂect the wider national policy agenda for the NHS
and social care (Health and Social Care Select Committee 2018)
though Greater Manchester has sought to move further and
faster than elsewhere. There are similarities with the
development of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships
(STPs) and Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) elsewhere in England,
though Greater Manchester arguably has more devolved control,
more formal governance arrangements, more local authority
engagement, and a stronger central Partnership Team leading 
the reforms.  In addition, the vision for Greater Manchester
encompasses wider public service reform and economic growth
agendas, linking with the broader devolution arrangements in 
the city-region.
Since October 2015, researchers at The University of
Manchester have been following the development of health and
social care devolution in Greater Manchester. We have worked
closely with the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care
Partnership and the NHS organisations and local authorities who
are involved. The research has been funded by The Health
Foundation and the NIHR CLAHRC for Greater Manchester. 
Our research set out with three main questions in mind:
• Understanding policy development and the policy process –
what were the objectives of devolution, how they were
constructed and developed over time, and how key
stakeholders contributed to or inﬂuenced policy
• Understanding the governance and accountability
arrangements and organisational forms and structures 
put in place through devolution, how they interact with 
existing arrangements, and how they work in practice
• Following the changes to services as they develop – seeking 
to understand planned changes and their underlying logic
model and then to map and measure their implementation 
and impact on service metrics and health outcomes
We also identiﬁed at an early stage (Walshe et al 2016) three
cross-cutting objectives which seemed to us to underpin the
logic of devolution – subsidiarity and changes to the level at 
which decision making and accountability would sit; greater
integration of health and care services; and increased 
eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness.  
Our qualitative ﬁeldwork started in December 2015 and
concluded in September 2017. We negotiated access to observe
meetings, both those held in public and in private, and to collate
internal reports, papers and other documents.   This report
draws upon a range of data sources including 343 hours of
meeting observations, 50 interviews with key informants, our
notes from a wide range of events such as conferences and
seminars about devolution, and two roundtable events we held.
It also draws on our archive of papers and GM Partnership
documentation.  Our quantitative research has used existing
data sets to undertake an ex-ante evaluation of some of the key
assumptions underlying service changes in Greater Manchester,
and this report presents those ﬁndings.  Further quantitative
analysis to track changes in healthcare usage and health
outcomes metrics set out in the Greater Manchester plan Taking
Charge will be reported in 2019. Our research methodology is
outlined in detail in Appendix A.
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We are hugely grateful to many people from the Greater
Manchester Partnership who have contributed to both our
qualitative and quantitative research, and to our funders for their
support. It is important to note there are some limitations to the
research – for example, our qualitative ﬁeldwork was focused
mainly across Greater Manchester rather than in individual
localities, and though we followed the development of
devolution for two years, we ceased ﬁeldwork in October 2017.
We have not studied the wider programme of devolution in
Greater Manchester, or undertaken ﬁeldwork to study some
similar initiatives (such as Sustainability and Transformation
Partnerships) elsewhere. 
This report is authored by the research team as listed, but we
would like to acknowledge the contributions of other academic
colleagues at The University of Manchester including Yiu-Shing
Lau, Matt Sutton, Kath Checkland and Ruth Boaden, We are
thankful for many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
report from our funders, from colleagues from the GM
Partnership, and from our external peer reviewers and our
Advisory Group. Of course, responsibility for the analysis,
interpretation and conclusions in the report and any errors rests
with the research team.
This report presents our main ﬁndings, drawing on documents,
interviews and meeting observations to illustrate those ﬁndings.
We have chosen not to quote directly from interview transcripts
and meeting observation notes, in part because it is diﬃcult to
do so and still maintain the anonymity of our participants, 
but we do seek to make it clear how our ﬁndings are grounded 
in our ﬁeldwork. 
First, chapter 2 outlines the background to devolution and the
history and wider context for the current reforms in Greater
Manchester. Then chapter 3 provides a detailed and largely
chronological account of health and social care devolution in
Greater Manchester, tracing its origins from past eﬀorts at
collaboration and joint working, outlining how the devolution
agreement came about and the preparations for devolution, and
setting out what has happened since the GM Partnership was
established. Next, chapter 4 draws our on qualitative research to
describe the development of the collective arrangements for
governance in the GM Partnership, and explores how what we
term “soft devolution” has evolved over time, and how
relationships between organisations have developed. Chapter 5
then draws on both our qualitative and quantitative research to
examine how health and social care services and systems have
changed, tracking and describing progress in three of the main
transformation themes – improving population health,
transforming community based care and support, and
standardising acute care. Finally, chapter 6 brings together 
our conclusions, and discusses what can be learned from the
experience to date of devolution in Greater Manchester.
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2
In this chapter, we put Greater Manchester health and social care devolution in a
wider conceptual, historical and political context. We ﬁrst explore what is meant by
devolution, before turning to situate devolution in the historical and geographic
trajectories of the United Kingdom. We discuss how the current devolution agenda
principally focused on city-regions in England may be distinguished from previous
devolution to the nations of the United Kingdom in the late 1990s as well as other
changes within England since. Then we examine how health and social care
devolution ﬁts into the wider context of reforms to the English NHS and its
relationship with local government.
2.1. The meaning of devolution 
Put simply, devolution involves a downwards shifting of power
and resources usually from national to sub-national levels. It may
cover a range of political, economic and social domains and may
also address issues associated with identities, policy divergence
and the nation state (Mackinnon, 2015). As a process of state 
re-structuring, devolution can be seen as part of a set of 
wider trends which have reshaped the traditional idea of the
nation-state including economic re-structuring, globalisation,
and public services reform (Jessop, 2002; Rodriquez-Pose and
Gill, 2003; Brenner, 2004). Devolution may involve the shifting 
of a combination of political, ﬁscal and administrative powers
usually to an elected body or form of government at sub-national
level though the term is also used to describe the transfer of
powers to local but non-elected public bodies.  
Some authors attempt to place devolution within a typology 
of decentralised governance. Here, more modest forms of 
de-centralisation move from de-concentration towards
delegation and devolution of public sector functions
(e.g. Rondinelli et al., 1983).   But the distinction drawn 
between delegation and devolution is often diﬃcult to 
make unambiguously.  For example:
“Delegation refers to the transfer of
government decision-making and
administrative authority and/or
responsibility for carefully spelled out 
tasks to institutions and organizations 
that are either under its indirect control 
or independent”. 
(Cohen and Petterson, 1996: 11; our emphasis). 
“Under devolution, the central government
allows quasi-autonomous local units
ofgovernment to exercise power and
control over the transferred policy”. 
(Schneider, 2003: 38; our emphasis).
We are cautious about simplistic accounts of devolution which
evoke a zero-sum, single block transfer of power from one
discrete level to another when in fact there are a complex set of
processes to be  negotiated. Devolution raises important
questions about where best to locate democratic accountability,
decision-making powers, ﬁnancial controls, regulatory functions,
political power and other responsibilities. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
in a changing world shaped by various economic and political
tensions and crises, and given that states are increasingly
inﬂuenced by a wide-range of actors and organisations, where
any agreement is found, this may not remain ﬁxed for long.   
As one prominent actor in UK devolution once observed:
“devolution is a process, not an event” (Davies 1999).
Research into devolution oﬀers a rather mixed picture of its
consequences or eﬀects.  It has both its advocates and
opponents, shaped by disciplinary and theoretical debates as
well as diﬀerent political positions. Those in support often
emphasise that devolution promotes an economic dividend with
increases in ﬁnancial self-suﬃciency and economic
competitiveness. Lower levels of decision-making are often
argued to be most eﬃcient and ﬂexible, and better at managing
with limited resources and oﬀering enhanced local
empowerment and democracy (e.g. Donahue, 1997; Keating,
1999; Oates, 1972). Along with the more recent claims that it
may enable outcome-focused, place-based organisation of
services, this all sounds quite familiar within the current English
devolution agenda. 
Others urge more caution, suggesting that there is often a lack
of empirical evidence to substantiate the claims made for
devolution (e.g. Rodriquez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). They suggest
that a gap may exist between the rhetoric of devolution and the
reality, and note that the devolution of resources and
responsibilities may have profound implications for notions of
equity and fairness (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Indeed,
whilst many of the apparent beneﬁts of devolution have
ostensibly become ‘common sense’ within an English context, at
the same time many commentators criticise the consequences
of increased variation and divergence and the so-called
‘postcode lottery’ that may result (Bivins and Crane, 2017). 
2. Placing devolution in context
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There is no neat academic consensus on the eﬀects and
consequences of devolution processes. After all, there is no
reason to assume that shifting resources and responsibility
downwards will in and of itself lead to the intended outcomes. It
is important to be clear about what functions and services are
under negotiation through such processes (Peckham et al.,
2005).  Crucially, what matters is to understand the interactions
that cut across and between these diﬀerent levels of
government and decision-making. This requires us to look
closely at the speciﬁc institutional arrangements and policy
issues at hand.  
Since devolution can clearly take many forms and the
governance and re-making of sub-national territories is in turn
inﬂuenced by their particular historical legacies and inherited
institutional landscapes (Pike et al., 2016) it is helpful to situate
our understanding of health and social care devolution in Greater
Manchester in the wider context of the development of
devolution within England.
2.2. Towards English devolution
The United Kingdom has a complex and contested history of
devolution. The following account is inevitably partial and
condensed, with particular emphasis on England to establish the
context for Greater Manchester. This emphasis is in itself quite
unusual given that until recently, England was seldom mentioned
in devolution legislation (Bogdanor, 2001). However, the recent
city-regional devolution deals have not come from nowhere, and
there is a history of tensions between central and local
government, stalled attempts at regional government and
growing concern about economic spatial unevenness which is
important to understanding the conditions under which recent
devolution deals have been established. We ﬁrst provide a
national overview before turning to focus on how Greater
Manchester features in this narrative.
Broadly speaking, and not without challenge, the UK can be
understood to have long operated with a centralised political
settlement. When the NHS was created as part of the post-war
settlement in 1948, it was one aspect of a Keynesian national
welfare state focused on equalisation and redistribution of
wealth and infrastructure across the UK. Over the course of the
second half of the 20th century, central government increasingly
expanded its reach into local government, exercising  increasing
ﬁnancial control over local government from the 1970s onwards
(Cochrane, 1993). Whilst the extent to which this increased
centralisation was successful may be debated, local government
increasingly became a target for reform with the ‘pre-eminence
of the Treasury and the treatment of local expenditure as a
matter for national decision’ (Rhodes, 1986: 239). 
At the same time, and particularly under successive
Conservative governments from 1979 onwards, there was a shift
from seeking to support and protect national and regional
economic interests towards intentionally exposing industries
and regional economies to both national and international
competition and using markets to drive competitiveness even
where this would accentuate regional or other inequalities. Local
authorities were re-structured to become more ‘entrepreneurial’
and to embrace a range of public management reforms, including
outsourcing, competitive tendering and increasing
managerialism. These were, of course, simultaneously deeply
political struggles, with Labour-led municipal councils, for
example the Greater London Council and Greater Manchester
Council, in direct opposition to the government of the time
(Quilley, 2000), which led ultimately  to the abolition of
metropolitan county councils in 1986. In this context, ideas of
English devolution rarely gained much attention.
It was devolution within the United Kingdom to Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland in the 1990s that marked what Bogdanor
(2001:1) termed the ‘most radical constitutional change this
country has seen since the Great Reform Act of 1832’. As
Coleman et al. (2015: 377) observed: ‘The UK is an example of a
unitary state where the countries of Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland have some autonomous devolved powers
delegated by the UK Parliament. This has developed as a way of
enabling these countries to have forms of self-government
whilst remaining within the UK’. Consequently, the devolution
settlements included health and social care policy and provision
and four diﬀerent systems for health and care began to evolve
from the common foundations of the NHS.
Within England, successive governments began to explore the
idea of devolution, albeit with diﬀerent geographies. For
example, the ﬁrst Greater London Mayor was elected in 1999,
following the establishment of the Greater London Authority the
previous year after a referendum. Elsewhere, however, attempts
at establishing regional elected assemblies stalled after they
were rejected in a vote in the north east in 2004. It is worth
noting, by comparison, that no such democratic mandate was
sought for devolution in Greater Manchester.
Localism has, in diﬀerent ways, always existed as a feature of
British politics, be that the powerful local government ﬁgures of
the late nineteenth century, the post-war municipal socialism of
some cities or the pragmatic Toryism of the shires (Clarke and
Cochrane, 2013). Much like devolution, as a rather imprecise
term spanning a range of policy and political issues, localism has
been a gift to politicians from across the political spectrum. 
2. Placing devolution in context
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Following the centralisation of the 1980s, a new localism agenda
was pursued towards the latter stages of the Labour administration
in the 2000s. However, localism came to the fore under the
Conservative-led coalition government which passed the
Localism Act 2011 providing a statutory basis for giving new
freedoms and ﬂexibilities to local authorities and communities in
a range of areas.   Increasingly, calls were made by central
government to empower local government, communities and
individuals on the basis that local people were best placed to ﬁnd
solutions to local issues. Thus narratives presented localism in
terms of increased democracy, the removal of bureaucratic ‘red
tape’ and ‘taking power away from Whitehall and putting it back
in the hands of councillors and councils’ (Pickles, 2011: np).
Initiatives such as Total Place began to emerge, under the idea
that the re-organisation of public services around place could
simultaneously improve how services are provided and save money
(HM Treasury/CLG, 2010). And yet, for all the empowerment of local
authorities, this localism became intertwined with the politics of
a centrally-driven period of unprecedented ﬁscal austerity. 
As a consequence of the Localism Act 2011, Greater Manchester
was able to become the ﬁrst Combined Authority in 2012. Senior
actors in the city-region used its track record of collaboration
and good relationships with the Cameron-Osborne
administration to become the ﬁrst city-region to negotiate a
devolution deal in 2014, largely behind closed doors, with little
involvement or engagement of local councillors or MPs and with
hardly any public debate or engagement (Jenkins 2015). Soon
known colloquially as ‘DevoManc’, the devolution deal
incorporated control over a range of budgets including transport,
housing and skills and employment to support an economic
growth agenda, on the condition that a directly-elected Greater
Manchester mayor would be established. While there was a
reference in the agreement to Greater Manchester producing a
business case for health and social care integration, the
announcement of health and social care devolution came several
months later. The deal was criticised by some stakeholders for
the near absence of democratic engagement or scrutiny and the
way it was concluded by a small elite group of local authority
leaders (Kenealy et al. 2017), although it could be seen as the
culmination of years of institutional reform in the city-region
(Gains, 2015).
The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 marked a
signiﬁcant return towards the metropolitan tier of government,
albeit in a rather piecemeal fashion. As Deas (2014) has
observed, under devolution not only are city-regions being
imagined as the level or scale at which functional economic 
interactions take place, but that ‘[c]ity-regions are the principal
scale at which people experience lived reality’ (Storper, 2013: 4).
Much like the localism agenda that went before it, devolution to
city-regions has been accompanied by continuing ﬁscal austerity
and a shift of responsibility from national to local levels to
implement and absorb reductions in local authority funding
(Lowndes and Garnder, 2016; Etherington and Jones, 2017).
Corresponding with the rise of the broader Northern
Powerhouse agenda backed in particular by the then-Chancellor
of the Exchequer, George Osborne, devolution has been
presented as an attempt to address the regional spatial
unevenness of the national economy and to improve regional
economic performance. The Treasury has exerted considerable
inﬂuence within these elite-driven devolution deals (Tomaney,
2016). Indeed, some argue that ‘despite all the talk about
devolution, this remains a strongly centrally prescribed process
of state restructuring’ (Ward et al., 2015: 422). Cautious of the
gap between rhetoric and reality, Ayres et al (2017) draw the
conclusion that the full extent of the promised ‘devolution
revolution’ across England has not occurred.
And yet, devolution has never just been a national project. For
senior ﬁgures in Manchester and to some degree in wider
Greater Manchester, devolution has been a long term ambition
and the metropolitan region has played an important part in the
development of the idea and the underlying policy framework.
Long-established senior ﬁgures in local government have
championed the ability of Greater Manchester to work
pragmatically with the government of the time in the interests of
the city-region and its people, and marshalled the economic and
social case for change. Devolution forms the latest development
in this narrative of Greater Manchester’s urban renaissance.   For
many, the election of Greater Manchester’s ﬁrst mayor in May
2017 marked a particularly important turning point in the
development of this narrative – although the outcome of the
election was never in doubt, the process provided a legitimacy
for the postholder in articulating both within and across Greater
Manchester and at a national level a distinctive manifesto for
government.  The mayor’s formal powers are substantial, though
they are largely exercised in collaboration with the ten local
authorities and their leaders, but his informal positional authority
and political momentum are considerable. 
But arguably, it has been the devolution of health and social care
which has received most attention both nationally and regionally
as part of the wider devolution process and so we now turn our
attention to setting that enterprise in context. 
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2.3. The context for health and social care devolution
in Greater Manchester
Before the formation of the NHS in 1948, local authorities played
a major role in healthcare services, funding and running municipal
hospitals and community health services.  But for reasons of
both national and local politics, the creation of the NHS brought
all hospitals under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and a
structure of appointed regional hospital boards and hospital
management committees.  Further reforms in 1974 brought
community health services and public health, which had
remained with local authorities since 1948, into a new integrated
architecture of largely appointed regional, area and district
health authorities, in parallel with elected local authorities which
now had no healthcare responsibilities but remained in charge of
social care.  Since then a succession of NHS reforms has,
paradoxically, often spoken the rhetoric of localism and
devolution but eﬀectively brought ever greater centralisation,
with command and control from what is now the Department of
Health and Social Care (Klein, 2017: 14).  Until the 1980s, local
government remained involved as up to a third of members of
health authorities were councillors appointed by local
authorities, but that link was severed when reforms were
introduced in the 1990s which split responsibility for
commissioning and providing health services and created the
NHS internal market.
Since devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in
1999, their healthcare systems have started to diverge from
England with in general a move away from markets and
competition, while the NHS in England has continued with a
variety of organisational forms for commissioning and the
creation of NHS foundation trusts for hospital provision and
primary care trusts (PCTs) to both run community health services
and commission primary care and secondary care.  However,
there continued to be a level of regional governance in regional
health authorities, latterly called strategic health authorities.
Even so, the rhetorical calls for devolution and local freedoms
continued (Working for Patients White Paper, 1989; Delivering
the NHS Plan, 2002)
The coalition government reforms of 2012 brought perhaps the
most signiﬁcant changes to NHS governance, creating over 200
clinical commissioning groups which were membership bodies of
general practitioners to commission secondary healthcare,
abolishing primary care trusts and strategic health authorities,
and moving most of their responsibilities to a new national body,
the NHS Commissioning Board (which was soon retitled NHS
England). Though proposed with the overt aim of liberating the
NHS from central control, these reforms proved profoundly
centralising in practice (Timmins 2012), and removed for the ﬁrst
time any formal regional tier of governance, though NHS England
quickly established a structure of area teams to manage a wide
range of administrative challenges which required a regional
perspective. These reforms also moved some responsibilities for
public health which had been held by PCTs to local authorities
while also creating a new national body, Public Health England
(Gadsby et al., 2017).   
The story is diﬀerent for social care which was once largely
funded by government and provided by local authorities and
health authorities, but which through a series of reforms in the
1980s and 1990s is now partly funded by local authorities and
partly funded by out of pocket payments by service users and
their families, while most services are now provided by the
private sector.  Access to local authority funded social care is
means-tested  and local authority budgets have been under
increasing pressure in the years of austerity since 2010, so
entitlements to care have been progressively stricter, payments
to private sector providers have been driven down, and access to
social care has become more diﬃcult for many people in need of
services.    In 2012, the coalition government’s White Paper
Caring for our Future sought to reform and standardise the way
eligibility for care was assessed and, subsequent legislation in
the Care Act 2014 introduced a new set of rules and criteria for
assessment, but did not address growing concerns about the
adequacy of public funding, the fairness of means-testing for
social care services, or the problematic interface between NHS
continuing healthcare  and social care services (Department of
Health 2012; Care Act 2014).
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That tension which exists between healthcare which is tax-
funded, free at the point of use and largely provided by the public
sector and social care  which is means-tested, for which many
people have to pay out of pocket, and which is largely provided
by the private sector is self-evident.  The tensions have become
more pressing in the recent period of austerity as cuts to central
government grants to local authorities (NAO 2018a) and
consequent reductions in access to social care have eﬀectively
increased demand for health services.  There have been many
attempts to encourage health and social care integration, with
powers to pool budgets in health and social care and to delegate
functions of NHS bodies to local authorities and vice versa
provided by section 75 of the NHS Act 2006.   More recently, the
Better Care Fund was established by NHS England to pool up to
£5.9 billion pa of funding between CCGs and local authorities for
schemes largely aimed at improving social care and reducing
demand for hospital services.  However, a study by the National
Audit Oﬃce found that service integration has been slower and
less successful than planned and the Better Care Fund has not
delivered the expected savings or reductions in hospital activity
(NAO, 2017).
In many ways, the NHS today is living with the legislative legacy
of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the fragmentation
and centralisation of the NHS that resulted (Timmins 2012,
2018a).  In 2014, NHS England published a document titled the
Five Year Forward View (FYFV) (NHS England 2014) which marked
a fundamental change of direction – from competition and
markets towards collaboration and integration, though the
Health and Social Care Act 2012 remained in place.  It argued that
‘the traditional divide between primary care, community
services, and hospitals - largely unaltered since the birth of the
NHS - is increasingly a barrier to the personalised and
coordinated health services patients need’ (NHS England 2014:
16). The document set out a number of so-called new care
models, aimed at integrating community and hospital services,
and led to the establishment of a programme of Vanguards –
pilot project designed to test out these new care models 
across England. 
The announcement of Greater Manchester health and social care
devolution in February 2015 needs to be seen in the context of
these existing institutional arrangements, in which responsibility
for healthcare spending rests ultimately and ﬁrmly with the
Department of Health and Social Care, while responsibility for
social care spending rests with each individual local authority.  
It was agreed that Greater Manchester would take responsibility 
for its £6bn health and social care budget from April 2016. The
twin stated aims were to improve health outcomes and reduce
health inequalities both within Greater Manchester and between
Greater Manchester and other areas of England, and to address a
growing gap between need and demand for health and social
care and available resources to provide them.
However, these aims are far from the whole story.   The rationale
for health and social care devolution was and remains quite
contested.  Some saw this as an historic opportunity to gain
greater regional governance of the NHS, and to integrate health
and social care under local government control. Others regarded
it, more  pragmatically, as a way to resolve the fragmented and
complex organisational legacy of the Lansley NHS reforms and a
longer history of purchaser/provider arrangements, replacing
them with simpler, place-based integrated healthcare systems.
Some took it to be an opportunity to reform health (and social
care services) to focus more on public health, primary care and
prevention and less on urgent, acute and specialist care.  Some
argued it was a way to bring together health, social care and
other public services to address the wider set of social
determinants of health – such as education, housing,
employment, and the environment.  Others saw it as a way to
secure greater eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness at a time of very
constrained resources.  At the same time, some stakeholders
doubted these aims and saw devolution as a transfer of ﬁnancial
burden at a time of austerity, or a technocratic  exercise in
reorganisation, or a way that unpopular changes to local 
services would be pushed through.
Unlike other components of the devolution deal which
represented hard transfers of power backed up by orders made
using powers in the Cities and Local Devolution Act 2016, the
devolution of health and social care was made and enacted
through an administrative agreement between the Greater
Manchester Combined Authority, NHS England, clinical
commissioning groups, NHS trusts and foundation trusts and
local authorities. The Greater Manchester Health and Social Care
Partnership has no separate statutory existence, but is hosted
by NHS England which employs its chief oﬃcer and most senior
staﬀ.  All the existing accountabilities for NHS organisations and
local authorities to regulators, national bodies and government
remain in place. Health and social care devolution has added a
layer of organisational complexity to an already complex
landscape, despite the shift in emphasis towards place-based
collaborative working and integration (Checkland et al. 2015).
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Similar place-based reforms have been developing elsewhere in
England, again without any change to the underlying legislative
provisions of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (Hammond et
al. 2017). NHS England  has organised  the  NHS  into  44
geographically based Sustainability and Transformation
Partnerships (formerly Plans) which bring together NHS
organisations and local authorities to  work collaboratively on
place-based planning and delivery of health and social. The
scope for STPs is broad and foregrounds improving quality and
developing new models of care; improving health and wellbeing;
and improving the eﬃciency of services. Indeed, Greater
Manchester is designated as one of the 44 STPs covering
England, originally announced in 2016.
From April 2018, 10 of the more developed STPs (including
Greater Manchester) have been designated as Integrated Care
Systems – which are described as even closer partnerships of
NHS organisations and local authorities which will take collective
responsibility for managing resources, delivering NHS standards,
and improving the health of the population they serve.
Evaluations of the early development of ICSs suggest that while
there is considerable enthusiasm in some quarters for the
concept, realising it in practice is diﬃcult and progress has varied
considerably.   They caution against unrealistic expectations of
transformation and change, note that establishing ICSs requires
a lot of groundwork and relationship building, and set out a
lengthy list of requirements for their future development
(Charles et al 2018). 
In July 2018, following the announcement of a longer-term
ﬁnancial settlement for the NHS, work commenced at NHS
England on developing a ten year plan for the NHS which is due
to be published in late 2018.   It seems likely that this plan will
build on the place-based reforms outlined above, and provide
some further support for these developments in Greater
Manchester and elsewhere, though some have cautioned that
the lessons from past exercises in long term planning have not
been learned (Edwards 2018).
2.4. Summary
This brief review of the meaning of devolution and its history in
England, and of the health and social care policy and system
context for health and social care devolution in Greater
Manchester, makes it clear that this is far from being new
territory – there is a long and complex history to relationships
between central and local government and the NHS.  It also helps
to illustrate that the term “devolution” itself has been used to
describe a wide range of legislative and administrative reforms
involving some shift of power and responsibility between levels
of government.
There have been multiple, overlapping and often contradictory
reforms of the organisation and governance of health and social
care commissioning and service provision (Holder and
Buckingham 2017).  The underlying problems have not changed
much – the tensions between free healthcare and means-tested
social care, between centralised NHS governance and
democratic local government, and between seeking
improvement through competition and choice versus
improvement through integration and collaboration. Klein (2017:
16) suggests that ‘The forces that have driven centralisation –
accountability for public funds and equity – have not changed.
Neither has the capacity of the centre to deﬁne expectations and
monitor performance at the periphery. While it remains the
ambition that every citizen should have the same standard of
service – an ambition still to be fulﬁlled – the scope for devolution
will remain constrained’.
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Health and social
care devolution in
Greater Manchester: 
a chronology3
In this chapter, we provide a chronological outline of the development of health and
social care devolution in Greater Manchester. We ﬁrst discuss the history of joint
working across Greater Manchester both through the Association of Greater
Manchester Authorities and through NHS organisations and networks. Next we turn
to discuss the build up to the devolution deal in 2015 and the preparations for the
establishment of the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership in April
2016. Then we describe how the GM Partnership has developed since it was set up.  
3.1. A history of joint working in Greater Manchester
Devolution in Greater Manchester builds on many years of joint
working across the city region. Following the abolition of the
Greater Manchester Council in 1986 (Local Government Act
1985), the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities
(AGMA) was established as a voluntary collaboration between
the ten local authorities. AGMA has since played a critical role in
shaping policy and governance across the metropolitan area, and
has developed and changed over time in response to the needs
of its constituent local authorities and the city-region (Ward et
al., 2015). Relationships with central government substantially
improved over this period, as senior leaders particularly in
Manchester moved away from political hostilities associated
with its past left-wing agenda to instead pursue a position as an
entrepreneurial city-region happy to work pragmatically with
governments of either main political party. From its investments
in assets like the Manchester Airport Group to its close
partnership with property developers in the regeneration of the
city centre, the narrative of a business-friendly, successful, place
with a track record of embracing reforms has emerged, if rather
carefully curated.
Whilst much attention on joint working focuses on AGMA and
the continued inﬂuence of key senior ﬁgures in Greater
Manchester, there is also a history of collaboration between NHS
organisations in the city-region. In 2005, the Association of
Greater Manchester Primary Care Trusts was established with
formal joint decision making authority to jointly commission
health services across the area, and it has played a central role in
the Healthier Together initiative to plan the reconﬁguration of
certain acute services in Greater Manchester. 
The Localism Act 2011 provided for the establishment of
combined authorities with Greater Manchester Combined
Authority (GMCA) becoming the ﬁrst, building on the
foundations created by AGMA. In 2013, it published the Greater
Manchester Strategy (GMCA/AGMA, 2013) Stronger Together
which set out a vision for achieving sustainable economic growth
and the reform of public services. It documented initial work
underway to integrate health and social care as part of GM’s
public service reform ambitions. The initial GMCA Devolution
Agreement (Treasury/GMCA, 2014: 1) contained a reference to
an invitation to GMCA and GM Clinical Commissioning Groups
(CCGs) to develop a ‘business plan for the integration of health
and social care across Greater Manchester, based on control of
existing health and social care budgets’.  
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1986 Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) formed as a voluntary association of the 10 local 
authorities, following abolition of Greater Manchester County Council
2005 Association of Greater Manchester Primary Care Trusts established with formal joint decision making 
authority to jointly commission health services across the area
2009 Greater Manchester given City Region status and allowed under Local Democracy, Economic Development
and Construction Act 2009 to establish a combined authority with formal delegated powers for public 
transport, skills, housing, planning, and economic regeneration
2011 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) established—the ﬁrst formal administrative authority for
Greater Manchester since the abolition of the county council
2012 Greater Manchester Association of Clinical Commissioning Groups established, with lead CCG arrangements
for specialised and joint commissioning and coordinated approach to service reconﬁguration
2013 GMCA and the Local Enterprise Partnership issue joint strategy for economic growth and reform
July 2014 Greater Manchester and government agree £476m of government funding for growth and reform plan
November 2014 GM Devolution Agreement sets out further devolution of powers on planning, land, transport, and ﬁre services,
and changing governance of GMCA to introduce arrangements for a directly elected mayor from 2017
February 2015 Memorandum of Understanding agreed for health and social care devolution, covering £6bn a year 
of expenditure
Adapted from Walshe et al. (2016)
Figure 1.  The  history of joint working in Greater Manchester
3.2. Preparing for devolution
In February 2015, Greater Manchester secured an agreement
with the government to take control of the £6 billion pa budget
for health and social care for the 2.8 million people of the 
city-region (see ﬁgure 1). This agreement, formalised in the
Health and Social Care Devolution Agreement ‘Memorandum of
Understanding’ (MOU), was signed by representatives of AGMA,
NHS England (NHSE) and the twelve Greater Manchester CCGs.
Providers were not formally party to the initial agreement
although the MOU included letters of support from Greater
Manchester NHS trusts, foundation trusts and the NW
Ambulance Service.
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Figure 2.  Map of Greater Manchester local authorities (adapted from Ordnance Survey OpenData)
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The MOU outlined the principle that ‘all decisions about Greater
Manchester will be taken with Greater Manchester’
(AGMA/NHSE/NHS GMACCGs, 2015: 5; emphasis in original). It
conﬁrmed that Greater Manchester would remain part of the
English NHS and social care system, meeting statutory
requirements and duties including those of the NHS Constitution
and Mandate. Despite references to ‘devolution’ of
responsibilities or funding within policy papers and popular
media, as noted in the MOU such references formally relate to
the delegation of commissioning functions and resources to a
joint commissioning board. CCGs, local authorities and NHS
England remained accountable as statutory organisations. A
directly elected Greater Manchester Mayor was a condition of
the 2014 devolution agreement, albeit with temporary
arrangements until May 2017, but the mayor was to have no
formal authority over health and social care.
The stated aims for Greater Manchester health and social care
devolution outlined in the MOU were: to substantively improve
the health and wellbeing of the 2.8m population with particular
emphasis upon public health and prevention rather than reactive
care; to close the health inequalities gap within Greater
Manchester and between Greater Manchester and the rest of
the UK; to deliver eﬀective integrated health and social care
across Greater Manchester; to shift care closer to home; to
strengthen a focus on wellbeing including public health; to
contribute towards economic growth of Greater Manchester;
and to develop links between the NHS, social care, universities
and science and knowledge industries to encourage innovation
(AGMA/NHSE/NHS GMACCGs 2015). Health and social care
devolution built on the aims of the GM Strategy (GMCA/AGMA,
2013) and devolution agreement (2014), wherein improving the
health and well-being of the population is associated with a wider
‘growth and reform’ agenda that reaches beyond health and
social care. 
The formative stages of health and social care devolution in
Greater Manchester were led by a transition management team,
formed of approximately 20 staﬀ that were either on
secondment, attachment or working in addition to their existing
roles. It included the interim chief oﬃcer for Greater Manchester
health and social care devolution; chief executive, Manchester
City Council; director of health and social care for Greater
Manchester devolution; alongside other representatives from
NHS organisations and local authorities in Greater Manchester,
GMCA and the NHS England area team. 
In July 2015, a further MOU was signed with Public Health
England and NHS England committing ‘to create a single uniﬁed
public health leadership system capable of contributing to a
transformational and sustainable shift in the health and wellbeing
of the population’ (Public Health England et al., 2015: 128). As
part of this process, a Greater Manchester director of population
health was to be appointed ‘funded from existing resources for a
time limited period’ (Public Health England et al., 2015: 125). 
The activities of the devolution transition management team
involved working closely with NHS England in the GM Devolution
Programme Board whilst the Partnership was in shadow form.
This task and ﬁnish group was established to oversee transition
until the formal delegation and was co-chaired by the chief
executive of NHS England and chief executive of Manchester
City Council. The close involvement of NHS England illustrated
the high proﬁle nature of these reforms. 
During this transition period, in July 2015 the long established
GM Healthier Together Committees in Common, comprising
representatives from each of the 12 CCGs in Greater
Manchester conﬁrmed its decision to create four shared single
services for emergency abdominal surgery. A high-proﬁle judicial
review was launched to challenge the decision, but it was upheld.
Healthier Together provided a key example of NHS organisations
in GM working together to create shared services and the use of
delegated decision making between GM organisations, predating
the devolution agreement. 
In December 2015, the strategic plan, ‘Taking Charge of Health
and Social Care Devolution in Greater Manchester’ – or Taking
Charge – was published (GMCA/NHS in GM, 2015a). The ambition
of devolution was described as delivering the ‘fastest and
greatest improvement in the health and wellbeing of the 2.8
million people living across GM’ (GMCA/NHS in GM, 2015a: 4). It
set out a number of key objectives: upgrading the approach to
prevention, early intervention and self-care; redeﬁning how
primary, community and social services become the cornerstone
of local care; standardising and building upon specialist hospital
services through the development of shared hospital services;
and creating eﬃcient back oﬃce support.
Taking Charge outlined the need to address existing
fragmentation of health and social care and the poor health
outcomes in Greater Manchester. Moreover, it argued that the
health and social care system had to change in order to address a
predicted £2bn deﬁcit by 2020/21. A one-oﬀ £450m 
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Transformation Fund from NHS England to help enable
transformation over the ﬁve years, was announced at the same
time. This funding was intended to ‘drive the transformation
changes in health and social care required’ (GMCA/NHS in GM,
2016a). It was made explicit that this funding was not intended 
to address ﬁnancial deﬁcits. 
As a ‘high-level’ strategic document, Taking Charge outlined the
overarching plan for devolution, the governance structure in
Greater Manchester, the focus upon place-based locality plans in
the ten localities, early implementation priorities as well as
setting out intended population health outcome targets around
three areas of start well, live well, and age well. The model for
devolution was predicated on a shift in activity from reactive,
crisis services to preventative services, shifting from use of 
in-hospital acute care to out-of-hospital ‘community-based’
settings.  It set out ﬁve transformation themes (see ﬁgure 3).
The ﬁrst theme – a radical upgrade in population health
prevention - sought to control or reduce growing demand for
public services through more people taking responsibility for
their own health and well-being through self-care and prevention
as well as public health interventions. The second theme –
transforming community-based care and support – was focused
on delivering integrated care in each of the ten localities, led by
local care organisations (LCOs) or similar single service
integrated models which would bring together health and social
care staﬀ to deliver care in a community-based rather than
hospital settings.  The third theme – standardising acute and
specialist care – focused on acute service reconﬁguration and
standardisation to centralise services to a smaller number of 
lead provider sites within Greater Manchester.  The fourth 
theme focused on the standardisation of ‘back-oﬃce’ functions
building on the recommendations of the Carter Review (2016). 
3. Health and social care devolution
in Greater Manchester: a chronology
25
Figure 3. Taking charge: transformation themes (GMCA/NHS in GM 2015a).
Enabling better care
The creation of innovative organisational forms, new ways of commissioning, contracting and payment 
design and standardised information management and technology to incentivise ways of working across 
GM, so that our ambitious aims can be realised.
Radical upgrade
in population health prevention 
A shift in focus to population health that
supports GM residents to self-manage,
innovates the model for prescribers and 
pharmacies, and tackles the future
burden of cardiovascular
disease and diabetes.    
Transforming community
based care and support
A new model of care closer to home that
includes scalable evidence based models 
for integrated primary, acute, community, 
mental health and social care.  Key features 
will be targeted case management of the
population most in need delivered by upskilled 
multi-disciplinary teams, together with 
streamlined discharge planning in order 
to reduce the demand placed
on acute hospitals. 
5
Standardising acute
and specialist care
The creation of “single shared services” 
for acute services and specialist services 
to deliver improvements in patient
outcomes and productivity, through 
the establishment of consistent and 
best practice specifications that decrease
variation in care; enabled by the
standardisation of information
management and technology.
Standardising clinical support
and  back office services
back office services
The transformational delivery of
clinical support and back office services at
scale across GM, including the establishment
of coordination centres to help navigate 
GM residents through our complex
system to the right services.
1 3
2 4
These transformation themes were supported by a range of
enabling programmes involving reforms to estates, workforce,
information management and technology (IM&T) and innovation.
In addition the plan set out cross-cutting themes to be co-
ordinated at the Greater Manchester level in primary care,
cancer, mental health, learning disability, dementia and services
for children. A further objective of ‘aligning our health and social
care system to education, skills, work and housing’ was later
formally added to the Implementation Plan for Taking Charge
(GMCA/NHS in GM, 2016b: 17).
In order to achieve these objectives, a planning process was
articulated with each of the 10 localities within Greater
Manchester being required to set out their vision for their locality
for the next ﬁve years as a ‘place’. This involved deﬁning how
they would improve the health and wellbeing of their local
population and how they would change services to contribute
towards reducing the growth of expenditure in Greater
Manchester. Locality plans were assured and signed-oﬀ by each
locality health and wellbeing board. Whilst there was some
recognition of a degree of diﬀerence between localities’ needs,
the plans broadly adhered to common principles of joined up
commissioning, joined up provision and a focus on prevention
and improving population health. The process of locality planning
involved submission of ﬁrst draft implementation plans to the
GM devolution transition team and to revise those plans locally
following feedback. The plans were required to describe the
governance for establishing joint commissioning, integrating
ﬁnancial planning across the locality, an understanding of their
place-based payment mechanisms and their communications
work, and a key component of access to transformation funding. 
It was clear that new ways of working together would be needed,
and Taking Charge set out proposed governance arrangements
in some detail (see ﬁgure 4). As a whole, the GM devolution plans
involved 37 statutory organisations: 10 local authorities, 12
CCGs and 15 NHS trusts and foundation trusts, along with
representatives from primary care, Healthwatch, community and
voluntary sectors, Greater Manchester Police, Greater
Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and NHS England. 
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Figure 4. Initial governance arrangements in Greater Manchester
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All of those interests were represented on the Strategic
Partnership Board (SPB) which was set up to provide overall
strategic direction for Greater Manchester health and social care
devolution.   It met in public at the end of each month with a
remit which included:
• Agreeing the GM Health and Social Care Partnership strategic
priorities;
• Ensuring that there remained ongoing and signiﬁcant
organisational commitment across the GM health economy to
both the devolution agenda and a devolved health system;
• Providing leadership across the GM health economy to ensure
that the key strategic priorities for a GM health system are
achieved.
At the outset some quite complex stratiﬁed voting
arrangements were put in place for the Strategic Partnership
Board.  For a proposal to be carried, it had to have support of
75% or more in all four membership groups eligible to vote –
namely, GMCA, CCGs, NHS trusts/foundation trusts and NHS
England (though during our ﬁeldwork we did not see these voting
arrangements actually used). Representatives from the four
primary care provider groups (dental, general practice,
optometry and pharmacy) joined the SPB in November 2015.
The Strategic Partnership Board Executive (SPBE) was a smaller
body established to support the main SPB. It did not meet in
public, and its remit included:
• To receive regular reports on the delivery of the locality plans,
and refer any concerns that are identiﬁed back to the relevant
locality; 
• To provide a forum for the membership to raise any issues
relating to the delivery of locality plans that cannot be
addressed at a locality level; 
• To propose to the fund holders of the Transformation Fund the
allocation in accordance with the agreed criteria, and to seek
reports from the recipients to enable reporting to the
Strategic Partnership Board in relation to each of the
investments. 
There was also a Joint Commissioning Board (JCB) which
brought together all the commissioning bodies in GM into a Joint
Committee for GM-wide binding commissioning decisions.
Throughout our research it remained in shadow form because
agreement was not reached on how the arrangements for
delegating commissioning to the JCB would work, and it did not
meet in public.  It was to be responsible for delivering the Greater
Manchester commissioning strategy, and commissioning
services at the Greater Manchester level.  
The GM Association of Clinical Commissioning Groups:
Association Governing Group (AGG) existed prior to the
devolved arrangements and continued to meet. The renewed
overall ambition for AGG has been to lead the improvement of
population health outcomes for the population of GM; to agree
strategic priorities to ensure that they are fully aligned to the GM
Strategic Plan and CCG priorities; ensure all member CCGs act
collectively and in the best interests of the collaborative in order
to implement key decisions and successfully deliver the change
and represent a uniﬁed voice as the leaders of health
commissioning in Greater Manchester.
A Provider Federation Board (PFB) was also set up which brought
together the 15 NHS trusts and foundation trusts to support
providers to work together with a remit to improve patient
outcomes and the quality of patient care,  achieve ﬁnancial
stability and create a sustainable service largely through service
redesign and reconﬁguration.  A wider leadership team of the
local authorities was already in place in the city-region, which
involved senior leaders of the 10 local authorities across 
Greater Manchester. 
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These quite elaborate and complex new structures were
intended to bring people and organisations together and to
create new accountability relationships, as well as to secure and
sustain consensus and commitment to decisions. They were also
intended to foster a change in culture which would support joint
working, and to formalise organisations working together.
While the Taking Charge plan was being developed and these new
structures were being put in place, many other changes were
underway. For example, the localities of Salford and Stockport
were both selected to be part of the national FYFV Vanguard
programme in March 2015. A two-stage review for a Manchester
Single Hospital Service led by Sir Jonathan Michael commenced
in January 2016 and this process led to the subsequent merger
of Central Manchester NHS FT and University Hospital South
Manchester NHS FT in 2017. After being placed in special
measures as part of the national Keogh mortality review,
Tameside Hospital NHS FT began reforms which led to it taking
on responsibility for running community health services in
Tameside and Glossop and being renamed as Tameside and
Glossop Integrated Care NHS FT in September 2016. Local
authorities had their own reforms underway as well, often in
response to austerity and cuts in funding.  For example, Wigan
Council had established the Wigan Deal to encourage moves
towards ‘asset-based’ approaches, models of 
co-production and changing relationships between the council
and individuals which promoted increased individual
responsibility and resilience.  
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February 2015 Memorandum of Understanding agreed for health and social care devolution, covering £6bn a year of 
NHS spending. 
March 2015 Devolution Programme Board met for the ﬁrst time. As a board to oversee transformation, it was co-chaired by
Sir Howard Bernstein (Head of Paid Service, Manchester City Council) and Simon Stevens (Chief Executive
NHS England) and included representatives from NHS and Local Authorities bodies in GM as well as NHS 
England. It was disbanded in March 2016 in advance of formal delegation. 
July 2015 Memorandum of Understanding agreed with Public Health England and NHS England on securing a uniﬁed 
public health leadership system to help transform population health. Appointment of the ‘Director of 
Population Health Transformation’ followed on the 30th September 2015. 
July 2015 ‘Healthier Together’ decision to centralise some specialist surgical hospital care on to four sites to improve
outcomes was conﬁrmed. This decision later went to judicial review and was upheld. 
December 2015 Governance arrangements for health and social care approved and strategic plan ‘Taking Charge’ published.
One-oﬀ £450m Transformation Funding is conﬁrmed. 
January 2016 Judicial review to Keep Wythenshawe Special challenging the Healthier Together decisions is unsuccessful.
April 2016 Devolution ‘goes live’ with the formation of the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership. New
governance arrangements in place ready for formal delegation from NHS England. 
Figure 5.  Preparations for devolution 2015-2016.
3.3. The development of the Greater Manchester
Health and Social Care Partnership
The Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership
formally came into being in April 2016, and ‘took charge’ of the
£6bn pa budget for health and social care in Greater Manchester
though we have already noted earlier that in fact the control of
budgets and accountability and governance arrangements of
both local authorities and NHS bodies remained unchanged, and
that the GM Partnership was and is not, itself, a statutory body.
Most of the arrangements that have been outlined above that
developed under the devolution transition management team
continued and some staﬀ who had been involved continued in
their roles, but the GM Partnership did then move to put in place
a substantive leadership group, which we refer to as the
Partnership Team.
Around this time, a draft version of the Greater Manchester
commissioning strategy, ‘Commissioning for Reform’, was
published following approval at the SPB in March 2016
(GMCA/NHS in GM, 2016c). The strategy argued that bringing
together decision-making on commissioning was crucial to
overcoming existing fragmentation and enabling the integration
of health and social care. Moving to outcome-based, multi-year
capitation models harnessing provider collaboration provided a
rationale for integrated commissioning. At Greater Manchester
level, the Joint Commissioning Board was intended to be the
‘lead body for the commissioning of over £800m of activity
currently commissioned directly by NHS England’ (GMCA/NHS 
in GM, 2016c). It would focus on developing integrated
commissioning for priority areas such as adult social care,
children’s services, learning disability, mental health and
population health. Commissioning for Reform stated that the
JCB would phase in an increasing commissioning budget and
‘success’ would require commissioning at the ‘right’ level, i.e.
locality, sector (a group of localities) or Greater Manchester. 
The new chief oﬃcer of the GM Partnership took up his post in
July 2016. The role is actually an NHS England employee,
reporting to the NHS England chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer. NHS England
has internally delegated certain assurance roles to the chief
oﬃcer alongside some direct commissioning responsibilities
which among other areas, includes specialised services, public
health functions, primary care commissioning and certain CCG
assurance functions. There followed a number of new
Partnership Team executive appointments, including a chief 
operating oﬃcer, executive lead for ﬁnance and investment 
and executive lead for population health and commissioning.
Additional posts soon followed such as executive lead for quality
and executive lead for strategy and system development, and
associate leads in primary care, social care and acute care and an
associate lead jointly appointed with NHS Improvement. 
In August 2016, the Pennine Acute NHS FT was inspected by the
Care Quality Commission and received a highly critical report,
rated inadequate overall.  Normally this would have precipitated
the trust being placed into special measures and subject to
intervention and support from NHS England but instead it was
agreed by CQC and NHS Improvement that the GM Partnership
would lead the improvements required, and that Salford Royal
Hospital NHS FT (which was rated outstanding) would assume
leadership of the trust and develop the necessary improvement
plan.  Salford’s proposals were then presented in public to the
SPB and agreed, with expressions of support from the diﬀerent
CCGs involved.
A number of further strategic documents were produced over
the following months. This included the primary care strategy,
the population health plan and the cancer strategy, and a set of
principles for co-production intended to guide collaborative
working in Greater Manchester.  Additionally, memoranda of
understanding were agreed with the voluntary, community and
social enterprise sector, Sport England, and the Pharmaceutical
Industry Partnership Group. The Pride in Practice initiative to
improve access to primary care for the LGBT community which
had been  established in Manchester in 2011 was expanded
across all of Greater Manchester’s ten localities.
Over the summer months a review of GM Partnership
governance took place and changes were agreed in September
2016 to address concerns about the alignment of locality and
Greater Manchester programmes, balancing leadership
responsibilities, avoiding duplication, and providing clear
oversight of the delivery and assurance of the strategic plan and
management of the Transformation Fund.  An eﬀort was made 
to reduce the number of separate projects and groups in place,
and to improve oversight.  In the following month, there was 
also a ‘reset’ of the governance of the on-going acute sector 
re-conﬁguration work. This was so that a hospital site strategy
could be incorporated and also to bring greater coherence for
managing its implementation. This work was overseen by a new
associate lead post in the Partnership Team.
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The Transformation Fund was framed by the Partnership 
as centrally important and was to be used to support
transformation rather than to sustain services and cover 
deﬁcits.  It was said to not involve a ‘traditional’ bidding-process.
A three-stage process was established to support submissions.
Criteria were established to ensure that proposals were aligned
with the Taking Charge plan, enabled transformational change,
consolidated resources, secured value for money and facilitated 
learning.  Proposals were evaluated by an external independent
review, and decisions were made by a Transformation Fund
Oversight Group (TFOG) composed of representatives from the
GM Partnership who were not compromised by having a conﬂict
of interest (i.e. not currently submitting a proposal) with analytic
support from external consultants.  Spending from the
Transformation Fund is summarised in ﬁgure 6.
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Date Funded project Amount £m*
July 2016 Salford Locality 16.9
July 2016 Stockport Locality 15.8
Sept 2016 Tameside Locality 23.2
Dec 2016 Wigan Locality 14.87
Jan 2017 Adult Social Care (development funding)** 0.12 (revised: 1)
Jan 2017 Rochdale (development funding)** 0.604
Jan 2017 Bury (development funding)** 0.995
Jan 2017 Partnership Team costs 11.2 
Jan 2017 Healthwatch 0.2
Feb 2017 Bolton Locality 28.8
Feb 2017 Manchester Locality (LCO and SCF) 12 (up to)
Feb 2017 Primary Care Reform (GPFV national commitments) 41 (up to)
March 2017 Oldham (development funding) 0.77
March 2017 Traﬀord (development funding) 0.847
March 2017 Transformation Theme 4 - Carter Review (dev fund) 1
March 2017 Health Innovation Manchester 0.5 (revised: 1)
April 2017 Manchester Single Hospital Service 27.2 - 42.5
May 2017 Revised Manchester locality (LCO, SCF and enablers) 37.8
July 2017 Oldham Locality 21.3
July 2017 Healthier Together (inc. 5.5m for stranded costs) 17.2
July 2017 Mental Health (inc. Dementia United) 56.2
August 2017 Bury Locality 14.9
August 2017 Rochdale Locality 23.5
Sept 2017 Traﬀord Locality 22
Dec 2017 Salford (population health) 3.44
Dec 2017 Wigan Locality (phase 2) 15.43
* These agreed ﬁgures have often been revised in light of changing costs covered elsewhere 
(for instance, IM&T, mental health funding).
** Development (‘seed’) funding up to £1m can be signed oﬀ at the discretion of the Chief Oﬃcer
Figure 6. Transformation fund spending commitments 2015-2017.
Submissions to the fund were only to be made by locality leads
and transformation theme leads.  About £60m of the £450m was
made available for year 1 (2016/17), although the break-down of
funding between transformation and cross-cutting themes, as
well as annual split of funding was subsequently adjusted. At the
SPBE in July 2016, decisions on the proposals from the ﬁrst wave
of funding were made on four locality submissions. As part of
‘Salford Together’, Salford’s proposal to create an integrated
care system and integration care programme for adults received
£16.9m. ‘Stockport Together’ received £19m for the creation of
their Integrated Care Organisation (ICO) which joined 46 GP
practices to create new care pathways. Tameside and Glossop’s
proposal for their ICO did not receive funding although decisions
on their updated submission were later agreed. Manchester’s
Single Hospital Service did not meet the initial criteria for funding
at that point, though subsequently funding was allocated.
Additionally, the Chief Oﬃcer of the GM Partnership was later
delegated discretionary powers to allocate up to £1m directly
for cross-cutting and transformation themes.
Allocation of transformation funding was contingent upon the
signing of investment agreements with the chief oﬃcer of the
GM Partnership. This was quite a lengthy process especially for
the ﬁrst few localities, as the format and content for agreements
was developed and metrics and the expected returns on
investment were agreed.  By the end of 2016, the localities of
Salford and Stockport had concluded investment agreements to
release their transformation funding.  Funds were routed via the
CCGs, reﬂecting the statutory ﬁnancial accountability
arrangements.  After some revisions, Tameside and Glossop also
received £23m of Transformation Fund allocation to support
their Care Together programme in the locality. Wigan soon after
received an allocation of nearly £15m to support their plans. 
The three Manchester CCGs (North, Central and South) formally
merged in April 2017, meaning there were now 10 CCGs with
coterminous local authorities (with the slight exception of
Glossop which is in Derbyshire County Council). 
The ﬁrst Greater Manchester Mayor was elected in May 2017.
The new Mayor positioned health and well-being as a key
dimension of his manifesto commitments. This included a
number of key priorities around mental health, school readiness,
support for the carer workforce and homelessness and health.
His ambition for an integrated National Health and Care Service
drew considerable attention. The only direct link for the Mayor
into the GM Partnership is that he chairs the GM  Reform Board
as well as attending the Strategic Partnership Board. 
However, many of his ambitions were adopted and adapted by
the Partnership who observed in their annual report: ‘We have
already forged a good working relationship with the Mayor and
his oﬃce and are actively engaged in how we can align the
delivery of our business plan with the health and care
commitments in his manifesto’ (GMCA/NHS in GM 2017a). This
was reﬂected in comments from the GM Mayor at the Health and
Care Leaders’ Summit in 2017: “Today I think is about seizing the
opportunity that’s before us, the opportunity that devolution in
Greater Manchester – that has been long argued for – seizing the
opportunity that presents to write our own script, our own
future, to do what Greater Manchester likes to do best and 
that’s to do things diﬀerently, to do things better. That’s 
our opportunity.” 
Following extensive work by an external management
consultancy, the Greater Manchester Commissioning Review
was presented and agreed by the SPB in July 2017.  It outlined
the development of a single commissioning function in localities
and commissioning arrangements across Greater Manchester
and how this would shift towards LCOs as the take formation
across the city-region. Further developments included the
signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Royal
College of General Practitioners, the launch of the Greater
Manchester Plan and the agreement of £134m funding for
mental health services from the Transformation Fund and CCGs.
In spring 2017, the GM Partnership gained additional devolved
commissioning responsibilities from NHS England relating to the
North West Ambulance Service and 111, and at the end of the
ﬁnancial year published its ﬁrst annual report and accounts for
2016/17 (GMCA/NHS in GM, 2017a) and a business plan for
2017/18 (GMCA/NHS in GM, 2017b).  
By the time we concluded our ﬁeldwork in September 2017, 
the Healthier Together business case for the four ‘sectors’ of
Greater Manchester had been agreed locally by commissioners.
In October, the NHS England National Specialised Commissioning
Group agreed the delegation of £40m pa of additional specialised
mental health commissioning functions to the GM Partnership.
By January 2018, all localities had been awarded Transformation
Fund money with most of the resources allocated including
funding for cross-cutting and transformation themes.
Additionally, a further review of governance arrangements 
was underway.
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April 2016 Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership is formed. The draft Commissioning for Reform
strategy linking health and care budgets to 
July 2016  Chief Oﬃcer of the Health and Social Care Partnership arrives as NHS England employee and subsequent
arrival of new Partnership Team.
August 2016 Pennine Acute Trust rated inadequate following a CQC inspection. This prompted the invitation of Salford
Royal FT to oversee the leadership of the Trust immediately after the inspection.
September 2016  The conclusions to the review of governance were agreed by the Partnership leading to new boards including
Performance and Delivery, Quality, Financial Oversight and Transformation Portfolio Board
October 2016 By October, the new Partnership Team had been installed. This included a co-NHSI/Greater Manchester role.
The acute sector re-conﬁguration governance was ‘reset’ to incorporate a hospital site strategy and manage
its delivery. The primary care strategy was also published this month.
December 2016 Salford and Stockport become the ﬁrst localities to be awarded transformation funding, soon followed by
Tameside and Glossop, Manchester and Wigan.
January 2017  Memorandum of understanding agreement with the GM VCSE.
January 2017 Population health plan published.
February 2017 Cancer plan published.
March 2017 The GMHSCP report a £230m ‘surplus’ in their end of year ﬁnancial reporting.
April 2017 3 Manchester CGGs merge to become one and Manchester Health and Care Commissioning was formed 
(a partnership between the City Council and NHS Manchester CCG).
May 2017 The ﬁrst ever Greater Manchester Mayor is elected. 
September 2017 Healthier Together business cases are agreed in GM.
October 2017 Further delegation of specialised mental health commissioning responsibilities.
January 2018 All localities awarded transformation funding and almost all funding allocated. 
Figure 7.  The development of devolution 2016-2018
Taking charge 
together: governance,
accountability and 
relationships4
Chapters 4 and 5 of this report present the main ﬁndings from our research. This
chapter explores the governance and accountability arrangements put in place and
how they have worked and it is grounded in our qualitative ﬁeldwork of meeting
observations, documentary analysis and interviews with key participants (described in
Appendix A).   We examine how and why the new devolved arrangements constitute
what we describe as ‘soft’ devolution. We elaborate on this concept and the
implications for the development of devolution, and for the balance between
organisational autonomy and collectivity. We also explain the consequences of 
the devolution arrangements for power relationships at the local city-region level,
examining the extent to which the creation of a new local GM administrative tier
has resulted in a growing accumulation of power at this level.  
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4.1. The possibilities and limits of soft devolution
Our research found that Greater Manchester’s health and social
care devolution settlement is currently relatively limited. In
accordance with NHS England’s spectrum deﬁning the models of
devolution (NHS England, 2016) there has been internal
delegation from NHS England to the chief oﬃcer of the Greater
Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership who is an NHS
England employee and who reports to the chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer
for NHS England. The Cities and Local Government Devolution
Act 2016 has made it possible for government formally to
transfer health and social care responsibilities to the Greater
Manchester Combined Authority, but these powers or provisions
in other legislation have not yet been used. Instead, Greater
Manchester devolution might better be described as a
constrained or soft form of devolution, enacted entirely within
the existing legislative framework for the NHS in England.  It is
essentially an administrative agreement between the
Department of Health and Social Care, national bodies like NHS
England and NHS Improvement, and NHS organisations and local
authorities and others in greater Manchester. Our ﬁeldwork
indicated that the character and quality of the relationships with
these national bodies have shaped and constrained what has
been possible in Greater Manchester to date.
This means that Greater Manchester’s adherence to national
policy objectives and processes has remained substantial,
despite rhetorical claims especially at the outset about the
freedoms enabled by health and social care devolution.
Throughout our ﬁeldwork, it was apparent that the Greater
Manchester system was closely bound by the ‘must dos’ and
planning guidance set by national bodies. 
We found that senior ﬁgures in Greater Manchester were careful
to frame their vision for devolution as working to a ‘place plan’
rather than an ‘NHS plan’ and to emphasise the extent of local
authority involvement in the devolved GM Partnership. This
approach stressed that developments in Greater Manchester
went beyond working between NHS organisations and a focus on
healthcare concerns alone, but involved a wider ensemble of
health and care organisations and actors and public services
more broadly. However, throughout our research we observed
the GM Partnership having to balance collective priorities for 
devolution with the rolling-out of the national NHS policy
agenda. National ﬁgures and organisations continued to exercise
substantial inﬂuence across the Partnership, despite the
existence of the devolution deal. The result has been that the
devolved health and social care system has not diverged much
from the arrangements elsewhere in England, though some
would argue that its ways of working, culture and relationships
are substantively diﬀerent. 
The fact that the GM Partnership has not secured greater
autonomy from the reach of these national bodies through
devolution was a disappointment for some participants. Several
of them commented on what they perceived as the inability of
the GM Partnership to break free of these relationships with
national bodies, viewing them as stiﬂing change though others
felt that delivering on national policy and accepting the
constraints of continuing national oversight had always been a
given in the devolution settlement. Pressures to respond to and
deliver national priorities consumed valuable time and energy,
with A&E targets and Delayed Transfers of Care presenting
particular challenges.  Some participants thought that a failure to
meet performance targets in these areas risked intervention by
national bodies.  Increasing eﬀorts were focused on mitigating
such risks – for example an Urgent and Emergency Care Board
chaired by the Chief Oﬃcer of the GM Partnership was formed 
to co-ordinate activities and attempt to improve performance.
Sustaining existing services to meet national targets had
implications for the GM Partnership’s ability to design and
implement service changes as we discuss in Section 5. However,
it is hard to tell whether concerns about the impact of national
targets from participants would really have translated into
changing, suspending or even removing such targets if that had
been possible through a diﬀerent devolution settlement.  
A key aspect of the devolution deal was a commitment to ‘close
the ﬁnancial gap’ as a system. Additional ﬁnancial resources for
sustainability and transformation made available to the health
and social care in Greater Manchester were not substantially
diﬀerent under devolution from those provided elsewhere in the
country, though the GM Partnership has had more autonomy to
determine how to use transformation funding. With the devolved
arrangements layered over the latest re-organisation following
the Health and Social Care Act 2012, nationally-allocated NHS 
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funding continued to be distributed to local NHS clinical
commissioning groups (CCGs) which ultimately remained
accountable for their functions to NHS England. CCGs continued
to adhere to the national process of 1% retention of a risk
reserve (rather than retaining this at their own discretion). NHS
trusts and foundation trusts remained individually responsible
for balancing budgets. Local authorities retained their existing
statutory functions and funding ﬂows, continuing to be bound for
example by the national cap on the adult social care precept on
council tax increases. Participants increasingly expressed
concern about the risks associated with centrally-administered
cuts to local authorityfunding and the eﬀects on social care, and
highlighted the impact of national policies on social care funding
and the regressive impacts of the social care precept as making
their task especially diﬃcult. The Chief Oﬃcer of the GM
Partnership and other leaders were quite open about the 
fact that devolution was taking place under challenging 
ﬁnancial circumstances.  
The  relationship between the GM Partnership and national
bodies might be conceived of as one of earned autonomy. Good
performance in the eyes of national bodies could be rewarded by
national organisations exercising lighter-touch regulation
combined with more favourable allocation of national capital and
increased ﬂexibility around local NHS decision-making. A
reported surplus of £237m across the GM Partnership at the end
of 2016/17 was seen by the Partnership Team as demonstration
of the strength of the system working together in Greater
Manchester, at a time of large deﬁcits in many NHS
organisations. For 2017/18, a system level surplus, albeit smaller,
was expected. Despite the highly constrained NHS capital
available for estates and digital infrastructure, the GM
Partnership was successful in gaining access to limited capital
available nationally. Furthermore, commissioning responsibilities
for specialised mental health, 111 and regional ambulance
service were devolved to the GM Partnership during 
our ﬁeldwork. 
This serves as a reminder that these relationships are not ﬁxed,
and with longer-term aspirations for a ‘harder’ devolution
settlement, senior actors in Greater Manchester were keen to
stress repeatedly the evolving nature of delegated
arrangements as part of the devolution journey so far. 
4.2. The growing power of the Partnership Team
In addition to impacting on Greater Manchester’s relationships
with national NHS bodies and central government, devolution
also had implications for relationships within Greater
Manchester and in particular, the shifting of power upwards to
the new Greater Manchester level.  Over the course of our
research, we observed the evolution of relationships within the
GM Partnership, with the Chief Oﬃcer becoming well established
as its lead voice over time. Our observations and interviews
indicated that he enjoyed legitimacy as the lead of the system,
and appeared to bring a renewed sense of coherence to the
Greater Manchester health and care system following his
appointment. The formal creation of the Partnership Team
comprising senior oﬃcers and a large team of staﬀ (many
transferred from NHS England) prompted suggestions from
some participants that a strategic health authority for Greater
Manchester was being re-created. At times, the Partnership
Team did indeed seem to resemble a statutory body in at least
some of its behaviours. It produced an annual report and
business plan to provide a summary of progress of the city-
regional system as a whole. Furthermore, successive reforms 
of GM Partnership governance arrangements tightened central
oversight and control of activities as was described in chapter 3. 
In our ﬁeldwork we found that the formation of the Partnership
Team was generally welcomed by senior leaders of organisations
within the GM Partnership. In particular, there was recognition
among them of the need to bring greater coherence and order 
to a remarkably complex set of change programmes that cut
across localities and Greater Manchester as a whole. However,
the establishment of the Partnership Team was not without
some concerns from the constituent organisations of the GM
Partnership. Ambiguity about the formal role and status of 
the Partnership Team added to this.
The Partnership Team were keen to reject the idea that they
were like a strategic health authority, instead stressing local
government involvement and their eﬀorts to encourage 
bottom-up system-wide empowerment through ‘distributed
leadership’ within the neighbourhoods of each locality, while at
the same time noting that they did not have the statutory
powers of a strategic health authority. However, they also
recognised that some centralisation of power had occurred over
time, and argued this was necessary to secure a suﬃcient degree
of consistency and coherence across Greater Manchester. 
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The delegation to the GM Partnership of control over the £450m
Transformation Fund provided a key mechanism for the exercise
of control at the Greater Manchester level. The fund was viewed
as providing a signiﬁcant opportunity to re-align both ﬁnancial
and patient ﬂows around place-based working of health and care.
It was explicitly intended for transformation activities rather than
ﬁnancing individual organisational ‘deﬁcits’ and the majority of
the £450m had been allocated by the end of our ﬁeldwork. The
Chief Oﬃcer of the GM Partnership and the GMCA Head of Paid
Service held joint responsibility for the fund, but staﬀ from all
organisations in the GM Partnership participated in discussions
about its use. However, scrutiny of applications for funding was
undertaken by a separate oversight body. This body used
revolving membership to include a range of participants from
across the GM Partnership and its operation was considered by
the Partnership Team as evidence of an early key success of
partnership working in action. Allocations from the fund were
generally required to commit to quite ambitious rates of return
on investment, and there was some scepticism expressed in our
interviews about how realistic the objectives and underlying
plans in some proposals were in practice.
The CCGs held the NHS funds allocated for transformation
although all the statutory bodies were signatories to the
investment agreements and supported the mechanisms
introduced for exercising control in relation to performance
against these agreements (such as suspending and ending
quarterly ﬁnancial allocations of transformation funding if
targets were not met).  But questions remained over what would
happen if proposed savings were not achieved and
transformation did not occur as planned, and about what would
happen once non-recurrent transformation funds had all been
allocated and expended. 
4.3. Tensions between organisational sovereignty
and partnership working
Considerable eﬀorts were made over the two years to move
towards collaborative based working across both locality and
Greater Manchester levels of planning. Yet this occurred in a pre-
existing organisational and legislative landscape in which
competition and fragmentation were key features. Partnership
working was a constant refrain, but this did not mean that it was
the norm. A lot of energy was expended in presenting the GM
Partnership in consensus to demonstrate the strength of
partnership working in Greater Manchester. This manifestation
of unity was despite its constituent health and social care and
voluntary sector organisations continuing to experience their
own individual statutory duties, regulatory requirements and
local organisational pressures. Nonetheless, the shared identity
of Greater Manchester was reinforced via the organisational
rituals of attending monthly meetings held in public, the
consistency of policy documentation and so forth. 
Participants recognised that national regulatory regimes were
still evolving and that legislative reforms to prioritise and
encourage system-wide working over organisational priorities
had not yet been forthcoming. However, despite the tensions
embedded within the organisational and legislative landscape,
there was often a remarkable absence of conﬂict within GM
Partnership meetings, both those held in public and those which
were not.  Some interviewees spoke of an atmosphere which
discouraged open expression of dissent.   We found that the
resolution of conﬂicts (for example, over Transformation Fund
proposals, or funding for the Partnership Team itself) was often
conducted outside meetings to mitigate the eﬀects of these on
the apparent unity of the project. There was recognition by
participants of the value of the new found collective voice and
the importance of building relationships between colleagues in
diﬀerent provider organisations.   But the emergent, ﬂuid and
dynamic nature of devolution sometimes seemed to generate
uncertainty and some disagreement among organisations within
the GM Partnership.  
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This process presented new challenges not just for NHS
organisations but also for local authorities, despite their long
history of collaboration across Greater Manchester. For
example, despite requests from NHS organisations over 18
months, local authorities were reluctant even to share much
information within Greater Manchester on their social care
expenditure. For local authorities, their social care spending
remained orientated around their own locality, and we were told
by participants that it was unlikely that agreement would be
reached that “the Traﬀord pound should be spent in Manchester”
(for example) , despite the potential beneﬁts of joint working
especially where service user or patient ﬂows crossed locality
boundaries. Similarly NHS foundation trusts found it diﬃcult to
resolve issues relating to the collective representation of the
provider voice in various forums where one provider might be
speaking on behalf of other organisations, or to act collectively
rather than individually.  For example, the ﬁnancial control totals
and sustainability funding operated by NHS Improvement to
incentivise NHS trusts and foundation trusts to meet their
ﬁnancial performance targets created powerful drivers at the
organisational level.  For that reason, despite eﬀorts by the
Partnership Team, it had not proven possible to agree a system
level control total for Greater Manchester as a whole.
The Greater Manchester-wide Joint Commissioning Board
comprised the 10 CCGs and 10 local authorities and was
positioned at the outset as one of the key opportunities for
working together through devolution. However, this body
remained in shadow form throughout our research. Its formation
required commissioning activity to be ‘delegated upwards’ from
individual bodies to legally form a Joint Committee, but our
research indicated that organisations were unwilling to do this
until they knew how the commissioning process would operate in
practice, and what the implications would be for their locality.
Indeed, the conclusion of a review of commissioning (during
2017) was to focus future commissioning activity largely within
localities through a single commissioning function for health and
social care rather than at the Greater Manchester level.  
Overall, whilst we acknowledge the time required to undertake
changes like this, we found in our ﬁeldwork that there has been
no great rush to commit to the ceding of autonomy for the
greater good in Greater Manchester. However, this is perhaps
understandable in the absence of formal changes to the
regulatory regime. This was demonstrated by the move towards
system-wide ﬁnancial control totals. Whilst this might have been
appealing for the Partnership Team, for individual NHS
foundation trusts, it presented a considerable threat to their
ﬁnancial autonomy. Statutory duties and separate decision-
making processes for individual GM Partnership organisations
remained with their individual boards. There was no great rush to
cede organisational sovereignty, and the ambition implicit in
memoranda of understanding conveying agreement to co-
produce decision-making was constrained in a competitive
organisational landscape. This was the case even when the
principles were generally supported by organisations and this
necessarily impacted upon the pace of the process. 
The presentation of Greater Manchester as a coherent
geographical health and care system builds on the existing
arrangements with AGMA/GMCA and the near coterminosity of
NHS and local authority commissioners. However, given the
challenges of overlapping boundaries of diﬀerent patient ﬂows,
regulator geographies and so forth, the idea of a neatly bounded
health and care system remains problematic, particularly  for
providers close to the periphery of the GM boundary or providers
with substantial activity and income generated from beyond
Greater Manchester. 
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4.4. The pace and scale of the task 
The GM Partnership was pursuing a large-scale change process
cutting across ten localities involving the design and
implementation of what was often said to be over 300 distinct
projects or programmes at a time when both local authorities
and NHS organisations were experiencing unprecedented
pressures in a complex and challenging environment. Moreover,
as one of the front-runners of an evolving, extra-legislative set
of changes responding to the national Five Year Forward View,
health and social care devolution was a politically and technically
complicated initiative.
In one sense there was an urgency to the devolution process
with a ‘do nothing’ option deemed untenable by senior ﬁgures
across the health and care system if the oft-quoted ﬁnancial gap
was to be closed and the sustainability of the health and social
care system was to be assured. Participants cited the existence
of a ‘burning platform’ as a catalyst for change. This was
particularly noted by local authority leaders, who were
experiencing some of the sharpest reductions in budgets in the
country.  Views were expressed by participants that change was
driven in part by austerity with nationally determined ﬁnancial
constraints impacting on the delivery of care locally. At the same
time, devolution was viewed as providing an exciting opportunity
to make necessary changes to service provision in mental and
physical health and care services. 
Senior leaders in Greater Manchester recognised that their 
ﬁve-year vision for change was very ambitious and that
devolution was an emergent, evolving and uncertain process. In
the ﬁrst year particularly, most eﬀort was expended on bringing
together the ensemble of actors and organisations working
together to make sense of and ﬂesh out the overarching
strategic vision.
Over the course of two years, we observed substantial individual
and collective eﬀort, energy and enthusiasm invested in
developing and implementing policies and strategies. Many
reports and strategic documents were produced and agreed,
governance structures organised and re-organised, business
cases drafted, and memoranda of understanding signed. These
included principles for co-production, with a diverse range of
organisations (for example, Sport England, the Voluntary,
Community and Social Enterprise sector and the pharmaceutical
industry). The sheer rate of production of papers and the number
of meetings undertaken was remarkable and all this activity
played a part in bringing people together and increasing the
familiarity of participants across Greater Manchester with one
another. Indeed, at times the rate at which the papers were
circulated and needed to be agreed upon was perceived by
participants as being almost too fast for partners to secure
engagement and gain agreement from their individual
organisations. Yet, conversely, there was also some frustration
expressed by participants that decision-making was not
necessarily any quicker than would have otherwise been possible
in the absence of the new arrangements under devolution.
Apparently contradictory views expressed by participants 
that the process was simultaneously too rapid and too slow 
make sense given the activities involved and the scale of 
the endeavour. 
The pace of change also appeared to lag behind the ambitious
aspirations presented by GM leaders at the launch of health and
social care devolution. This is, in and of itself, not necessarily a
bad thing, despite the desire of some actors for things to be
otherwise. Furthermore, it is understandable in a health and care
system characterised by contradictory pressures to compete
and collaborate and in a context where transformation is
constrained by the requirement to focus on sustainability 
of the status quo.    
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4.5. Politics of devolution and the wider growth 
and reform agenda
One of the opportunities articulated for Greater Manchester’s
health and social care devolution was the ‘once in a generation’
link to the wider devolution settlement for the city-region.
Greater Manchester was positioned as having the potential to
align health and care expenditure with wider public service
resources. With direct involvement of the ten local authorities,
health and social care could be orientated closely with the wider
growth and reform agenda of the city-region. There was an
opportunity to maximise a focus on population health, wealth
and well-being, with policies targeting wider determinants of
health like education, employment, housing, transport and
criminal justice increasingly playing some part in this process. In
our ﬁeldwork we found that this aspect of devolution had  been
slow to develop. Towards the end of our ﬁeldwork, rapid pilots
and projects connecting health to aspects such as work and
justice were beginning to come to fruition, although the full links
to the wider public service budgets had not yet developed. 
Over time, we observed a growing recognition of the need to
communicate to the public the progress and impact of
devolution in Greater Manchester. Linked to this, in the latter
stages of our research, there was discussion across the GM
Partnership of the need for increased involvement of members
of the public and the workforce to gain widespread support for
the developments and decisions being made. For locally-
challenging forthcoming decommissioning decisions associated
with the Greater Manchester-wide plan, particularly in the acute
sector, there was recognition of the need for local politicians and
community leaders including the new directly elected GM Mayor
to understand and be on board with the changes.  
While the early development of health and social care devolution
took place with almost no public or community engagement, the
GM Partnership worked with the Greater Manchester Centre for
Voluntary Organisations (GMCVO) in 2016 on a programme of
consultation with a wide range of partners and community
groups (Matziol and Martikke 2016).  This found that “most
[participants] seemed to have very little if any understanding.
Partnerships reported many participants being aware that
something was happening but not knowing any of the speciﬁcs”.
GMCVO is represented on the Strategic Partnership Board, 
a GM VCSE devolution reference group has been established, a
memorandum of understanding between the GM Partnership
and the VCSE sector was signed in 2017, and there is extensive
voluntary, community and social enterprise sector
representation on most other GM Partnership groups and
committees. The ten local Healthwatch groups in Greater
Manchester which are commissioned by local authorities
secured joint funding from the GM Partnership in 2017 for a 
GM Healthwatch Liaison Function, aimed at promoting joint
working and establishing Healthwatch representation in boards,
committees and working groups. 
The direct involvement of local authorities and elected members
within health and social care devolution, meant that elected
members were increasingly participating in local health and
social care commissioning arrangements which brought new
challenges for them,  Yet, despite understandable moments 
of uncertainty through new ways of working together, there 
were  early signs in our ﬁeldwork of leaders, clinicians, 
councillors and community groups working together across
organisational boundaries.
The election of the Greater Manchester mayor appeared to 
have inﬂuenced events in the GM Partnership. The role has 
only a relatively tangential link in the existing governance
arrangements via public service reform work, but there was a
developing alignment between the Mayor’s manifesto
commitments with health and social care planning and a
conscious eﬀort by the GM Partnership team to incorporate 
and cite the Mayor and those commitments in their plans. The
election of the Mayor happened relatively late in our period of
ﬁeldwork when relationships were still in their early stages
although the Mayor did communicate his direct support for 
the changes in progress.
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Devolution: making
change happen5
In this chapter, we examine the changes to systems of care and services been
planned and enacted that we have observed in Greater Manchester over the period
of our ﬁeldwork on health and social care devolution, drawing on both our qualitative
and quantitative research (as described in Appendix A). It is structured principally
around three of the main transformation themes in the GM Partnership’s plan, 
Taking Charge – population health improvements;   
5.1. A radical upgrade in population 
health prevention
A major ambition of Greater Manchester’s health and social care
devolution from the outset was to enable the greatest and
fastest improvement to health, wealth and well-being of its 2.8m
population. Greater Manchester has some of the worst health
outcomes in the country and there are large variations in health
outcomes within and across Greater Manchester.  For example, a
quarter of the Greater Manchester population lives in areas
which fall into the 10% most disadvantaged in England, and three
CCG areas are in the bottom ten in England for life expectancy.
Almost whatever we measure – from rates of chronic disease,
smoking or obesity to worklessness, mental health, school
readiness or children’s dental health, Greater Manchester is less
healthy, and some parts of the city-region have among the worst
health in the country (GMCA/NHS in GM 2017c).  the GM
Partnership has from the outset placed particular emphasis on
the need for a radical improvement in population health, both as
a goal in itself and as part of a wider improvement in wellbeing
and community development, recognising the links between
health, housing, education, employment and so on.  It has also
argued the need for a move upstream to prioritise health
promotion and disease prevention, both as an end it itself and as
a way to manage future demand for healthcare and other
services. Of course these health inequalities have persisted for
many years, and represent an embedded pattern of social and
economic disadvantage in some communities which is likely to
be hard to change, especially in the short or medium term.
Indeed, many of the plausible levers for change do not lie in the
health and social care system at all, but involve long-term eﬀorts
to develop community assets and capabilities and secure
economic and industrial regeneration, and the GM Partnership’s
plans for population health should be seen in that wider context
(GMCA/NHS in GM 2017c),  
The GM Partnership has committed to a series of population
health targets that run across the life-course in their strategic
plan for Greater Manchester. These were aimed at enabling the
population to  ‘Start well, live well, age well’ and included things
like reducing the incidence of low birth weight amongst
newborns, increasing school readiness amongst 5 year olds,
reducing deaths from cancer, cardiovascular and respiratory
disease and supporting people to stay well and live at home for
as long as possible.   Our quantitative research is following the
progress on these metrics and the ﬁndings will be reported in
2019.
The GM Partnership’s ‘whole system’ approach positioned the
health and well-being of its 2.8m population as shaped by more
than the formal provision of health and care services alone.
Explicit acknowledgement of the need to tackle the wider
determinants of health was accompanied by plans to ‘empower’
individuals and communities to change their behaviours, with
individuals expected to take increased responsibility for their
own health. 
Plans focused on prevention of ill-health, early diagnosis,
behaviour change and resilience, underpinned by a more social
model of health in contrast to traditional biomedical diagnosis
and treatment centred policies, and very much in line with
national policies and the Five Year Forward View. Asset-based
approaches featured heavily, aimed at increasing the role of the
voluntary sector in the formal provision and informal
championing of community support and social prescribing.
Changing the relationship between the public and public services
was central to the plan in Greater Manchester, with an emphasis
on championing positive change, rather than focusing on
deﬁcits. Self-care and individual responsibility were stressed and
whilst structural inequalities were acknowledged within the
population health plans, getting individuals to take responsibility
for their own health, wealth and well-being was an overarching
aim of the planned changes. Research has shown that
encouraging citizens to take greater responsibility for their own
health  is no easy task. During the ﬁeldwork period a Greater
Manchester population health strategy was produced and
updated and Greater Manchester-wide memoranda of
understanding associated with population health were agreed
with organisations including Sport England and the VCSE sector.
Subsequent strategies aimed at improving population health
were produced such as the Making Smoking History strategy
(intended to reduce smoking by a third to 13% by 2021), with the
backing of the Greater Manchester Mayor. We witnessed the
start of pilot projects within localities whilst Greater
Manchester-wide projects (e.g. children’s oral health, school
readiness, focused care etc.) were beginning to be implemented
with relatively modest allocations of transformation funding. 
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We saw the publication of many strategies and discussion of
numerous business cases in development. We also observed a
great deal of enthusiasm for making tangible improvements to
population health, as part of a process involving new actors and
organisations in change, including the Greater Manchester
Mayor. As with all the allocation and monitoring of
transformation funds, business cases and return on investment
modelling were used to underpin decision-making in relation to
public health investments. By the time we concluded our
research, however, there remained a long way to go before a full
programme of population health policies was widely
implemented across the localities and GM. Improving population
health outcomes is not an easy process and we would not expect
to see immediate changes, since many improvements take time
to come into eﬀect. However, much remains to be done to
achieve the GM Partnership’s ambitions for population health
improvement and the roll-out of population health policies has
proceeded quite slowly.
A real risk was that the population health agenda would be side-
lined as immediate pressures in health and social care services
took priority. All GM Partnership members agreed the
importance of the population health strategy and supporting a
shift away from treating illness to promoting wellness. However,
we observed no major shifts in expenditure away from hospital
care to support the population health agenda during our
ﬁeldwork. Furthermore, the GM Partnership recognised that
public health funding had actually been cut by local authorities
over this period following the shift of public health
responsibilities from the NHS to local authorities 
(Gadsby et al., 2017).  
Our quantitative research will examine the eﬀects of these
policies on population health outcomes. Our approach explicitly
accounts for the gradual way in which policies are being
implemented. We have used the Greater Manchester Population
Health Plan and its subsequent strategies, together with
discussions with population health leads at the GM Partnership
to extract our outcome set on which the impact of devolution on
population health outcomes will be measured.  We have used the
proposed policy implementation dates and estimated when
these policies would begin to have an impact. We have then
identiﬁed when the data would available to enable us to measure
that impact and plan to use this to enable us to quantify any
resulting changes in health outcomes.   This work is ongoing, and
will be reported on from 2019/20 onwards.
5.2. Transforming community-based care 
and support
Central to the Taking Charge plan was the view that care should
be shifted from hospitals to primary and community-based
settings wherever possible. Connecting with the theme of
radically upgrading population health, the ten localities adopted
a place-based approach to improving care and people’s lives. The
concept of local care organisations (LCOs) was at the heart of
the planned reorganisation of health and care under devolution,
with the intention of reducing existing service fragmentation
inherited from previous health and social care reforms.  LCOs are
population-based local adaptations of Accountable Care
Organisations. They are provider-led organisational alliances
based upon longer-term planning and contracting arrangements,
incentivised to manage expenditure and demand, and
encouraged to focus on measuring health outcomes. These mark
a signiﬁcant departure from the activity-based payment,
competition-based model which underpinned the logic of the
Health and Social Care Act 2012 (which remains in place). LCOs
were expected to bring coherence and coordination to changes
to population health as well as acute services.   A summary of the
ten locality based LCOs is given in ﬁgure 8.
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Locality Summary
Bolton No agreed name as yet.  It will be an integrated care organisation composed of 9 neighbourhoods.   Shadow
arrangements will be in place in 2018/19 overseen by Health and Wellbeing Board executive and a partnership
board.   Full ‘go live’ anticipated for 1st April 2019. 
First phase in 2018/19 focusing on adult acute and community health services and adult social care with 
GP-led neighbourhood working. Subsequent phases by 2021 to include children and young people, primary
care, mental health acute and community services and community and voluntary and small providers.  
Bury Bury Together 4 Bury – Bury Locality Care Alliance.  It will be a provider alliance.  MOU for LCO programme
board was established for April 2017., and LCO will be established for April 2018 under a mutually binding
contract.  New contract framework expected from 2019.
Focus is on key aspects of the transformation programme this year. By 2021, all age in and out of hospital care t
o be included except services part of Healthier Together and those not directly commissioned by Bury CCG or
MBC.  Core primary medical services under GMC contract to be aligned to LCO.
Manchester Manchester Provider Board (name to be conﬁrmed after contract award).  It will be a separate LCO entity 
(legal form to be agreed) with four equal partners - Manchester University Foundation Trust (MFT); 
Manchester City Council (MCC); Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust (GMMH) and the GP Federation
(MPCP). MFT is lead bidder/provider.  Will ‘go live’ in April 2018.
Phased approach to service transfer over three years covering the whole population, whole system integrated
approach by 2021.
Oldham Oldham Cares.  It will use an alliance contract.  A joint health and social care leadership group, shadow alliance
board and alliance establishment group are in place. MoU, terms of reference and draft alliance contract
agreed.  Anticipated to be formalised and in place for April 2018.
In 2018/19, will cover all CCG commissioning, adult social care, integrated children’s services, public health,
mental health, learning disabilities and devolved business.  By 2021 will cover above plus all primary,
community and acute care commissioned by CCG.
Rochdale No agreed name as yet.  It will be a partnership with a host provider - Northern Care Alliance.   Shadow LCO
development board in place, membership being developed.  Intended to ‘go live’ in April 2018.
In 2018/19 will cover a signiﬁcant element of adults health and social care – neighbourhoods including social
care , urgent care and primary care.  To cover all adults and children’s services by 2021.
Salford Salford Together.  It is an integrated health and social care system (IHSCS), with a lead provider for adult
services and wider supply chain where providers work together.  It has been in place since July 2016 with 
acute, community, adult social care and mental health for adults and older adults.
For 2018/19, all ages in scope for Salford locality plan for IHSCS.  Adults acute, community, social care and
mental health services.  Pooled budget c£240m.  Delegated commissioning of primary care.
Stockport Stockport Neighbourhood Care.  It is an alliance provider board working towards becoming an accountable care
trust. Alliance board has management team, GP lead in each of the 8 neighbourhoods, and programme team.
Launched in Oct 2017, plan to move towards single alliance contract for April 2018.
For 2018/19 covers adults with a focus on top 3,500 of adult population (identiﬁed by risk stratiﬁcation) with
enhanced case management support.  New services grouped into acute interface, intermediate tier, and
neighbourhoods.    Plan by 2021 to transform delivery of outpatients with focus on self care, GP supported
clinical decision making, clinical triage of referrals/investigations, alternatives to traditional appointments, etc.
summary continued
Structures for commissioning and providing care in localities
have been changing under devolution. There have been moves
to pursue integrated health and social care commissioning,
despite legislation requiring health and social care
commissioning to remain with the separate statutory bodies.
Rather than fully merging, locality-wide governance
arrangements have been put in place with single commissioning
bodies forming through strategic partnerships, and in a number
of localities the chief oﬃcer role of the CCG being ﬁlled by the
local authority chief executive alongside other joint working or
appointment arrangements. These single commissioning bodies
were increasingly being formalised with some pooling of
budgets. As we completed our ﬁeldwork, NHS, primary care and
voluntary sector providers were starting to come together to
formalise the ten LCOs, as outlined in ﬁgure 8
Working in collaboration across a variety of professional,
organisational and geographic boundaries, LCOs are intended to
incentivise health and well-being by aligning payments to
population health outcomes, stratifying the population
according to ‘risk’, moving services upstream to manage care
more eﬀectively and reduce urgent care demand. They have
much in common with a host of other past and current
organisational initiatives such as the Integrated Care Pioneers,
and the FYFV New Care Models and Vanguard programme. 
No single model of LCO was adopted uniformly across Greater
Manchester but, commonalities existed among the ten localities.
There was a broad expectation that these organisations should
be principally driven from the lowest level by neighbourhood
teams with an augmented role for primary care. At the end of the
ﬁeldwork the 10 LCOs in Greater Manchester were at varied
stages of development. The variation in approaches was shaped
by existing relationships between NHS organisations, GP
practices and federations, local authorities and voluntary sector
organisations and perceived strengths and development needs.
Many changes were already under way before devolution, such as
Salford’s foundation trust-led primary and acute care system
(PACS) and Stockport’s GP-led multi-speciality community
provider scheme (MCP) as part of the national FYFV Vanguard
programme. However, all 10 localities were broadly aligned to
delivering the strategic plan, and an LCO network was
established to encourage the spread of ‘best practice’ between
localities. 
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Locality Summary
Tameside and
Glossop
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS FT.  It is an integrated care NHS FT using FT licence to integrate
services.  Established Oct 2016.  5 integrated neighbourhood teams established in 2017/18 within ICFT.
During 2018/19 ICFT will, subject to due diligence, become adult social are provider.  New mental health
contract planned for April 2019.                                                   
Services covered  now are community care and hospital services. By 2021, will also include adult social care,
mental health, discretionary primary care expenditure.  Further ways of aligning GP and other primary care
services with the ICFT will be explored over the next few years.
Traﬀord
Traﬀord LCO.  It is progressing towards a MoU initially, planning to move quickly on to alliance agreement
through the Traﬀord LCO working group.  Aiming to launch LCO in shadow form from April 2018.  Plan to have
alliance board with deﬁned memberships, decision-making processes and accountability.
Discussions ongoing about services to include with view to phased approach in 2018/19. Aiming by 2021 to
cover all age, all services including mental health, voluntary, social care, acute, primary and community,
excluding specialised services.
Wigan Healthier Wigan  Partnership.  It is working towards an alliance agreement for April 2018.  The Healthier Wigan
Partnership board has been in place since November 2016.
Services covered in 2018/19 include whole population out of hospital services with some hospital. By 2021,
aim to cover out of hospital, acute and specialist services and wider services (e.g. housing, leisure, public
health, residential).
Figure 8.  A summary of local care organisation development in Greater  Manchester (as at late 2018)
Most of the Transformation Fund has been allocated to localities
to drive these changes, with high expectations of LCOs to
deliver their anticipated potential. Across the majority of
localities in Greater Manchester, initial investment agreements
have been put in place, which are centred on shifting activity
away from hospitals as a way of closing the ﬁnancial gap.
Projected reductions in activity and expenditure were based on 
a series of cost-beneﬁt analyses (CBAs) completed by localities
with the support of internal and external consultants. 
The assumptions made in the CBAs diﬀered by localities.
Estimated policy impacts represent the biggest driver of
projected expenditure reductions. Our research suggests that
some localities based these estimates on promising unpublished
early ﬁndings from New Care Models programme such the Fylde
Coast Local Health Economy and the South Devon and Torbay
Urgent and Emergency Care vanguards. However, robust
evaluations of the vanguards are yet to be published, and  a
National Audit Oﬃce report on the New Care Models programme
suggests that activity reductions for those targeted by the
vanguards may not have translated into activity reductions for
the whole population (NAO 2018b). Other localities have
estimated policy impacts based on avoiding a ﬁxed percentage
of expected activity growth, seemingly taking little account of
existing evidence. Taken together this suggests that the
projected expenditure reductions made in locality investments
agreements are highly uncertain. 
Some other commonly-made assumptions were examined in the
initial phase of our quantitative evaluation of devolution.  Firstly,
projected reductions in A&E attendances were usually assumed
to lead to proportionate reductions in non-elective admissions.
Secondly, projected expenditure reductions were estimated by
multiplying projected admission reductions by historical average
treatment costs, implicitly assuming that unit-costs are invariant
to changes in treatment volume. 
Testing the ﬁrst of these assumptions using historical activity
data, we found that,  holding the severity of attendees constant,
reductions in A&E attendances were associated with higher than
proportionate falls in non-elective admissions. This suggests
that if initiatives to relieve pressure on A&E departments are
successful, the consequent reduction in non-elective
admissions may be greater than assumed by the localities.
However, this is dependent on the nature of the intervention and
the groups targeted, as changes in patient case-mix and
therefore severity may change the relationship estimated here.
However, when testing the second assumption using historical
data on unit-costs and volumes of activity, we found that 
per-patient costs increased as admissions fall, as ﬁxed and 
semi-ﬁxed costs are spread over a smaller pool of patients 
at least in the short-term. 
Many of the CBAs applied ‘cashability’ adjustments reﬂecting a
recognition that only a proportion of projected expenditure
reductions will be translated into real savings. However, some
localities made no such adjustments, meaning projected
expenditure savings could be over-estimated.
Our ongoing quantitative research on devolution will assess the
extent to which projections made in the investment agreements
were accurate and are realised. This research will examine the
eﬀects of devolution on activity and expenditure across
outpatient, elective, non-elective and prescribing services, as
well as eﬀects on the eﬃciency and quality with which these
services are provided, and will report from 2019/20 onwards.  
When the 10 LCOs are fully established across Greater
Manchester, a major re-structuring of health and social care 
will have taken place. But even in the more formative stages,
LCOs already appeared somewhat at odds with the existing
organisational and legislative landscape, and securing
widespread support from stakeholders such as GPs for changes
to contractual arrangements is likely to remain problematic. The
initial expectation was that certain commissioning functions
would be transferred into the provider alliance/body of the LCO
which would then sub-contract services themselves. Challenges
are likely to persist in progressing work undertaken between
CCGs and LAs such as pooling of budgets, with continued
potential for disputes over organisational form and the politics 
of changes to commissioning and provision locally, within GM 
and nationally. A formal contracted approach using the national
ACO contract which was intended to be commissioned in the city
of Manchester is on hold at the time of writing because the
legality of the use of the contracts like this is subject to judicial
review, and most LCOs are using alliance contracting
arrangements as ﬁgure 8 shows.
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5.3. Standardising acute and specialised care 
A third major component of the developments outlined in Taking
Charge across Greater Manchester was a complex set of
changes to acute and specialised care involving all the NHS
trusts and foundation trusts in Greater Manchester. These
changes were intended to address and reduce variation in care
and improve patient outcomes across the whole of Greater
Manchester through the creation of ‘single shared service’
models for acute and specialised activity in the city-region,
covering in total about two thirds of all acute care activity. 
There is a long history of acute care reform and reconﬁguration in
Greater Manchester. A number of changes to acute and
specialised care were already planned or in progress before the
advent of health and social care devolution. The pre-existing
Healthier Together programme had advanced a range of cases
for clinical change since 2012, and reconﬁguration proposals had
been agreed or were in train for accident and emergency
services, acute medicine, emergency general surgery, and
gynaecological and urological cancer services. A series of further
priority services for reconﬁguration were agreed by the GM
Partnership in autumn 2016 including paediatrics (and
specialised children’s services); maternity; respiratory medicine
and cardiology; benign urology; musculoskeletal services and
orthopaedics; breast surgery services; neuro-rehabilitation; and
vascular surgery. Acute service reconﬁgurations were paused
and ‘reset’ in October 2016 to allow for a more comprehensive
hospital site strategy and a single plan for Greater Manchester to
be developed.   The interdependencies between services, and
the treatment of “stranded” costs left when services are
reprovided elsewhere have proven complex and contested.
Two of the reconﬁgurations which predated health and social
care devolution in emergency surgery and gynaecological cancer
are now in an implementation phase with service changes
expected to begin implementation in 2018/19. Changes to the
provision of urological cancer services were agreed in July 2017,
and planning has subsequently started for implementation.
However, with the need to secure agreement across acute care
providers and other stakeholders and to go out to public
consultation on the changes, the GM Partnership does not
expect to move towards implementation for further acute
service reconﬁgurations before 2019.
While the focus of Taking charge was on service reconﬁguration,
some major organisational changes have happened since the
advent of health and social care devolution, and have been
important tests of the ability of the GM Partnership to respond
to events and plan change collectively. The formation of the
Manchester University Foundation Trust out of the merger of
Central Manchester Foundation Trust and University Hospital of
South Manchester Foundation Trust was undertaken following a
review commissioned by Manchester CCG. The Northern Care
Alliance was created by Salford Royal Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust as part of the system-wide oversight of the Pennine Acute
Trust following an adverse Care Quality Commission inspection
and report, and the two NHS foundation trusts are now run by a
joint Committee in Common. Greater Manchester Mental Health
Foundation Trust was formed through the merger of Manchester
Mental and Social Care Foundation and Greater Manchester
West Mental Health Foundation Trust.  Tameside Hospital NHS
Foundation Trust assumed responsibility for managing
community health services for Tameside and Glossop and was
rebranded as Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS
Foundation Trust in 2016.
If these extensive plans for acute and specialised care
reconﬁguration are implemented by 2021, they will bring about a
very diﬀerent acute care system in Greater Manchester. Our
research indicates that devolution has enabled a system-wide
approach to the rather complex Greater Manchester landscape,
and has brought providers together with other stakeholders.
However, all the challenges of complexity, sector specialty
professional and organisational interests and the local politics 
of hospital provision remain. Whilst co-operation has been
apparent throughout the devolution process among
organisations, individual organisational pressures and 
incentives necessarily remain. The current devolution
settlement may make system-wide change more likely, but
it remains highly challenging.
It is worth noting that the Healthier Together programme of
acute service reconﬁguration was initiated in 2012 and not
signed oﬀ by Greater Manchester commissioners until autumn
2017. This illustrates the pace of progress for such complex
undertakings can be painfully slow. Public consultation will be a
key step in these changes, and there is an awareness of the need
to have political ﬁgures in localities and the GM Mayor on board
with the strategy.  
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5.4. Enabling devolution: supporting 
programmes and projects
The ambitious scale of the plans made under health and social
care devolution has meant that hundreds of initiatives and
programmes were started during our ﬁeldwork, with some
entering their implementation phase. These included
programmes to provide a system wide response in areas such as
workforce, estates and IM&T infrastructure which were seen as
key to the delivery of planned service redesign. These were also
areas in which existing problems such as staﬀ shortages leading
to competition between GM Partnership organisations, diverse
and deﬁcient IM&T systems and varying degrees of digital
maturity, insuﬃcient NHS capital funding to undertake estates
reconﬁguration and resource implications of major upgrades to
IM&T systems were seen as hampering the ability to achieve the
ambitious planned changes and related health beneﬁts. Whilst
there were no quick ﬁxes for these issues, the GM Partnership
structures and processes facilitated high levels of engagement
amongst relevant stakeholders and enabled alignment 
with regard to these issues of locality plans to those of the 
GM Partnership.     
Speciﬁc programmes of work have been developed aimed at
improving and standardising care in a range of areas such as
mental health, cancer, children’s services and dementia. In some
cases, these have beneﬁtted from allocations from the
Transformation Fund. However, these processes were still at a
relatively early stage when we completed our ﬁeldwork. GM
Partnership structures enabled stakeholders to come together
to work on system wide planning but the engagement of 
citizens and frontline staﬀ was very limited during our period 
of observation. 
The main Greater Manchester-wide public engagement work
under devolution to date has been the Taking Charge Together
initiative. This exercise undertaken with the  Greater Manchester
Centre for Voluntary Organisations involved asking the public
how they could be helped to take charge of their own health, 
and what they knew about health devolution reforms. At the 
GM Partnership level, the development of devolution appeared
relatively technocratic and was largely driven by senior leaders 
in the initial stages.  But there has been increasing public
involvement in a number of the programmes of work, for
example in the boards for programmes on mental health, cancer
and children’s services. A memorandum of understanding has
been established with the VCSE (voluntary, community and
social enterprise sector) and the ten local Healthwatch groups
have collaborated at a GM level. At the locality level, various
public engagement events were taking place, especially during
the latter half of our ﬁeldwork.  
There has been a strong emphasis placed upon learning and
evaluation in Greater Manchester’s approach to health and social
care devolution, with many visits and interchanges with people
and organisations from elsewhere in the UK and internationally.
A good deal of time and eﬀort has been spent developing an
evaluation framework, drawing on input from a range of
stakeholder across the GM Partnership and beyond. At the core
of this is the evaluation of the transformation programmes in
each of the ten localities. More generally, shared learning
between localities has been stressed from the early stages 
of our study and structures were in place which facilitated this.
Additionally, increasingly international ‘best practice’ was
sought, through learning networks with, among other places,
New York State and Glasgow. 
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Devolution unspun:
lessons from Greater
Manchester6
In this ﬁnal chapter, we seek to draw together the conclusions from our research 
on health and social care devolution in Greater Manchester. We draw together the
factual account of the chronology in chapter 3, the ﬁndings from our research on
governance and organisation forms in chapter 4, and the ﬁndings from our research
on the implementation of transformation programmes in the three main theme areas
in chapter 5. We seek to consider their implications for other areas and for other
initiatives aimed at integrating health and social care systems and reforming their
governance to take greater account of population, place and the wider public realm.
We noted in our  introduction the three main aims of our research – understanding
the policy process; following changes to governance, accountability and
organisational form; and mapping changes to services and their implementation 
and impact – and we use these broad headings to structure our conclusions.
6.1. Understanding the policy process: making sense
of devolution
The strategy set out in Taking Charge and other documents is not
unique to Greater Manchester.  Indeed, we have noted that most
of the policy agenda that is being pursued reﬂects closely the
national priorities of the government and the Department of
Health and Social Care, and the NHS mandate and priorities and
planning guidance of NHS England.  In that sense, devolution has
not been an exercise in allowing local autonomy or control over
policy, but over its implementation.  
Moreover, since the devolution initiative was established, other
approaches to achieving these same policy objectives have
evolved in the rest of England, including the Vanguard
programme, Sustainability and Transformation
Plans/Partnerships and latterly Integrated Care Systems.
Arguably, these initiatives have much in common with health and
social care devolution in Greater Manchester. We might see the
GM Partnership as having prototyped or pioneered changes now
being picked up more widely in England and as having had more
freedom in some areas like transformation funding, but beyond
that, it is hard to be sure what is the distinctive or additional
contribution of devolution per se.
The early promise of widespread devolution deals with local
authorities in many regions does not seem to have been borne
out – no new devolution deals have been agreed between
government and local authorities since 2016 (LGA 2018), with
other emerging deals in Yorkshire and the ‘North of Tyne’ running
into major challenges. Most of the current devolution deals do
not include health and social care, apart from those for Greater
Manchester and for London, and devolution is barely mentioned
in the Department of Health and Social Care’s mandate to NHS
England for 2018-19 (DHSC 2018), though the language of
devolution is being used in some other STPs.   It seems that the
momentum of the government’s devolution programme has
diminished somewhat – through changes in national political
leadership, the experience of trying to reach consensus about
devolution deals with  groups of local authorities with divergent
interests and political control, and the focus of political and
parliamentary attention on Brexit to the exclusion of almost
everything else. 
While this may have allowed the GM Partnership some additional
latitude to get on with health and social care devolution, it may
also mean that political support for further potential reforms –
for example formally transferring health and social care
responsibilities to the GMCA, or giving the elected mayor a more
formal role in oversight of health  and social care, or creating new
organisational forms for local care organisations, or extending
devolution further – might not be readily forthcoming.  
However, there is near complete consensus among stakeholders
in Greater Manchester and, we think, more broadly, that the
move towards more local or regional governance in health and
social care in England makes sense. At one level, this can simply
be seen as undoing some of the  eﬀects of the last government’s
NHS reforms, in which the intermediate tier of strategic health
authorities was abolished in 2012 (Hammond et al 2017).  It can
also be seen as a response to the longer term fragmentation of
healthcare services created by the purchaser-provider split, the
creation of NHS trusts and then foundation trusts, and the
establishment of various organisational forms in primary care of
which clinical commissioning groups are simply the latest
iteration. With an even longer and more historical perspective, it
can be seen as the most recent development in a decades-long
debate about the relationship between the NHS and local
government, and the place of local government and democratic
accountability in health and social care.   
There is also near universal support for the idea that greater
integration of healthcare services and of health and social care is
needed. This can be seen as a necessary response to
demographic and social trends in society, like increasing
inequality and disadvantage for some groups, rising levels of
chronic disease and multi-morbidity, a growing frail elderly
population, and so on.  It also represents the latest step in the
long running debate about how to organise and fund adult social
care, and deal with the many inconsistencies and problems
created by having separate funding mechanisms and
fundamentally diﬀerent entitlements. 
However, we should be cautious about claims that such reforms
will bring about transformations in population health, service
performance or uptake, or eﬃciency and costs.  The complex
reality is that these are wicked problems, and improvements are
likely to be hard-won, slow and incremental.  That is not a reason
to eschew ambition, but to temper it with realism.
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6.2. Changes to governance, accountability and
organisational forms
We have described the health and social care reforms in Greater
Manchester as soft devolution because unlike most such
reforms, they have no statutory basis. They are, essentially, an
administrative agreement between the Department of Health
and Social Care, national bodies like NHS England and NHS
Improvement, and NHS organisations and local authorities and
others in Greater Manchester. The reason for this is largely that
there has been no political appetite for primary legislation to
reform or replace the Health and Social Care Act 2012 even
though many of the structures and arrangements set out in the
Act seem at best irrelevant to and at worst signiﬁcant barriers to
devolution and to the wider shift towards more integrated health
and care systems in England. Ministers do have powers to enact
some statutory reforms through the Cities and Local
Government Devolution Act 2016 and other existing legislation,
but have so far chosen not to use them in relation to health and
social care devolution in Greater Manchester.
Whether this matters, is open to question. On the one hand, the
GM Partnership has assumed many of the trappings and
behaviours of a statutory body anyway. It holds board meetings
in public and webcasts them, it publishes its board papers,
produces many documents like annual plans and reports, and so
on.  People have observed that its leadership acts in some ways
like the strategic health authorities which existed before they
were abolished in 2012, but with the added component of local
authority engagement in governance. However, the reality is that
soft power has its limits, and the GM Partnership has few formal
levers to use over NHS organisations, and even fewer in relation
to local authorities. It has used its Transformation Fund of £450m
creatively to seek to drive change, but that is probably only
eﬀective at the margins, and while that additional and non-
recurrent source of ﬁnance lasts.  Moreover, it has not been clear
what (if anything) happens if investment agreement targets are
not achieved. Individual organisations continue, understandably,
to guard their autonomy carefully and to act in ways that, overtly
or covertly, serve organisational self-interest.
In part this is because all the existing architecture of governance
and performance management for those NHS organisations and
local authorities continues to exist, meaning there has been no
relaxation or variation in national waiting list, A&E and cancer
treatment targets, ﬁnancial controls, or regulatory oversight. At
a time of unprecedented ﬁnancial austerity for both local
government and the NHS, there has actually been little scope for
the GM Partnership and individual organisations to behave or act
diﬀerently if that would conﬂict with the demands of the current
performance regime. But it is also because many of these
existing organisations have long established and distinctive
structures, cultures and ways of working which are not easily
compatible with the new language of collaboration, integration
and collectivity.  
The GM Partnership has invested heavily in building relationships
among those health and care organisations which make up its
membership, and developing shared governance arrangements
and decision making processes which are intended to promote
and sustain a collective narrative of managed consensus.
However, it is diﬃcult to tell how secure those arrangements are,
and they have not yet really been severely stress tested, by
circumstances in which individual or groups of organisations
might, for example, be seriously disadvantaged in the interests
of the greater good of Greater Manchester.
6. Devolution unspun: lessons from Greater Manchester
51
6.3. Changes to services and health outcomes: 
too soon to tell?
There has been much rhetoric about the beneﬁts and
possibilities of health and social care devolution, particularly at
the outset when the devolution deal was ﬁrst struck between
national and local politicians and system leaders. There is a
strong political and emotional appeal for many people in the 
idea that decisions about health and social care in Greater
Manchester should be made in the city-region, rather than in
London. This ﬁts with a wider narrative about the renaissance of
local government in Manchester and other cities, evoking the
past glories of entrepreneurial, civic leadership and strong
municipal government (Headlam and Hepburn 2015).  It also
chimes with more recent thinking about localism, place-based
approaches to the governance of public services, and improving
the economic and industrial performance and contribution of
city-regions like Greater Manchester (e.g. MIER, 2009; 
Storper, 2013).  
Even so, the promises made at the outset, and the targets
articulated in the GM Partnership’s plan Taking charge seem very
ambitious.  Since the launch of devolution, much eﬀort has been
expended in establishing relationships, setting up governance
arrangements, and producing and agreeing strategies and plans ,
and the focus has only more recently shifted toward
implementation and changes that service users and the public
would notice.   The GM Partnership has set out a wide range of
changes it attributes to devolution (GMCA/NHS in GM 2018a).
Many of those examples of course predate the devolution
reforms, some represent recent transformation fund
investments, and some are still in their very early stages.Those
involved, especially at the outset, may have overpromised what
devolution would achieve or the timescale in which changes
would happen. We think this is well recognised by the GM
Partnership’s leadership which is now strongly focused on
implementation. 
The reality is that major health and social care system
reconﬁguration is very complex, time-consuming and diﬃcult to
enact, and it is diﬃcult to tell whether devolution makes a real
diﬀerence to the pace and scale of change.  In the past, the
approach to such challenges in Greater Manchester has been
largely incremental – taking one or two organisations, or
particular services across all or part of the city-region and
seeking to redesign them mostly through negotiation,
compromise and consensus.  But that can be a very slow
process, in which vested interests have little incentive to oﬀer
concessions and can block change, service interdependencies
are not easily addressed, and shifting costs or realising savings 
is problematic.  
The GM Partnership has consciously sought to take a more
transformational approach, embracing complexity and tackling
reconﬁguration across the system as a whole – in primary and
community care, most areas of acute care, mental health and
other services concurrently. This is an ambitious strategy – if it
works, it will achieve large-scale change much more rapidly, but if
it does not, it will have been a very time-consuming and
expensive exercise. It is still too early to tell.
It is also worth noting that those transformation plans, and the
associated ﬁnancial estimates on which funding has been
allocated to support these complex service reconﬁgurations,
make some  optimistic assumptions about the rates at which
planned changes will lead to shifts in demand for health and
social care, and in patterns of service usage, which will result in
eﬃciencies and savings. They also often contain limited details
of the underlying mechanisms which are intended to bring these
changes about. The aspirations which lie behind many of those
plans to provide services which are, for example, better
coordinated, closer to people’s homes, more targeted on need,
and aimed at preventing health problems or managing them
more proactively are admirable. But research and experience
elsewhere suggest that such changes may improve care, but will
not save money.
Understandably, the challenges of the health and social care
system and its reform have preoccupied the GM Partnership and
this is where the great majority of time, eﬀort and resources
have been invested over the few years. Perhaps as a
consequence, work on the population health strategy and its
implementation has moved relatively slowly, and some of the
exciting ideas that were voiced about better coordination and
collaboration between health and social care services and
making clear linkages to areas like criminal justice, education,
housing and employment have largely not yet materialised.  
6.4. Conclusions: what happens next?
We noted in chapter 1 that our qualitative ﬁeldwork took place
largely from December 2015 to September 2017, and allowed us
to get a detailed and nuanced understanding of the development
of health and social care devolution from the perspectives of
many diﬀerent stakeholders, which we have sought to
summarise in this report.  
Since then, we have continued to follow developments through
the many documents, reports, plans, meeting minutes and so on
that are in the public domain, and it is worth reﬂecting on what
has happened during 2018, and how that might add to the
ﬁndings we have outlined.
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In simple terms, the direction of travel set during 2017 has been
continued in 2018.  The GM Partnership published its annual
report for 2017/18 and business plan for 2018/19 in July 2018
(GMCA and NHS in GM 2018b) which outlines a host of ongoing
initiatives – ranging from an update on the progress in
establishing LCOs to participation in everything from the
national Dying Matters week to the Pride in Practice initiative.  It
provides much less detail on ﬁnancial performance, with a high
level summary reporting a GM wide (health and social care)
outturn of a £89m surplus compared with a planned £18.5m
deﬁcit, most of the improvement in outturn being attributable to
national sustainability funding allocations to NHS trusts for
meeting their control total targets.
The business plan for 2018/19 states at the outset that: 
“2018-19 sees us move fully into the third
phase of our operation as a devolved
system. The ﬁrst phase – lasting until April
2016 – was focused on establishing the
devolved settlement for health and care in
GM; the second – broadly until autumn 2017
– saw us embedding our governance,
strategies and programme structures as
well as supporting the allocation of the
majority of the Transformation Fund; the
third has an absolute focus on
implementation of our plans.”
The plans outlined are very much consistent with developments
in 2016 and 2017, though they frequently assert a need to
accelerate progress towards implementation – for example in
the service delivery changes expected of LCOs, or the design
and implementation of service reconﬁguration in acute and
specialised care.  The ﬁnancial projections for the year are
sobering – with NHS providers predicting a collective deﬁcit of
£159m (before provider sustainability funding of £83m) and four
providers being unable to agree to the control totals set by NHS
Improvement.  The plan contains little information about local
authority social care spending plans.  A long appendix sets out
many priorities for action in 2018/19, most concerned with
health rather than social care.
In conclusion, health and social care devolution in Greater
Manchester is in transition.  It is clear already that the devolution
deal struck in November 2015 was a starting point, not a
destination, and the GM Partnership is now focusing increasingly
on implementing a raft of new strategies and plans.  The
direction of travel in Greater Manchester has been fairly clearly
set, though the pace of change in the future is more diﬃcult to
predict.   Our quantitative evaluation, assessing progress
towards the various performance measures and outcome
metrics set out in Taking Charge is continuing, and the GM
Partnership is now commissioning its own evaluations of the
development and impact of LCOs and of a number of GM-wide
programmes.
It seems likely that devolution in Greater Manchester will need
some continuing support from central government including
access to resources and some relief from national performance
regimes and accountability requirements, and some further
devolved powers.  It does not seem, at this point, as if other
areas are likely to embark on health and social care devolution
following the Greater Manchester model, though as we have
noted some quite similar reforms particularly to the organisation
of the NHS are being pursued elsewhere.  
At some point, not just for Greater Manchester, a new legislative
settlement seems inevitable, to close the gap between statutory
legal position and the facts on the ground, and to formalise these
new forms of governance and accountability (Timmins 2018b).
The terms of that new legislative settlement are open to
question, and should be a matter for widespread public debate,
informed by, among other things, learning from Greater
Manchester.  In particular, there are two hugely important areas
for reform to which the Greater Manchester experiment is highly
relevant.  Firstly, the decades long process of ever greater
centralisation at a national level and  fragmentation at a local
level of healthcare policy and NHS provision could be reformed,
in ways that create greater regional or local place-based
governance, though this could also lead to greater variations in
service provision.  Secondly, the longstanding separation of
funding arrangements and entitlements for healthcare and for
social care could be reformed, in ways that promote integration,
improve eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness and reduce barriers to
access, though this would  increase overall costs and require
more funding.  
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The overall aim of the research set out in our research proposal to the Health
Foundation and the Greater Manchester Collaboration for Leadership in Applied
Health Research and Care (GM CLAHRC) was to contribute to the development and
evaluation of health and social care devolution in Greater Manchester, and to support
the sharing of learning regionally and nationally. 
The research had three main objectives: 
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Research methodology
The project received ethical approval from The University of
Manchester ethics committee (ref AMBS/15/01) and
coordinated NHS research governance approval from the Health
Research Authority (ref IRAS 192503).  
Over the period of the research, while these overarching
research objectives remained unaltered, our approach and
methodology needed to evolve to respond to the development
and timeline of devolution itself.  In particular, we extended the
time period of ﬁeldwork and analysis for both qualitative and
quantitative research to give more time for us to follow the
development of devolution and to seek to assess changes and
impacts – the third research objective.
Understanding policy development and
the policy process – what were the
objectives of devolution, how they were
constructed and developed over time,
and how key stakeholders contributed to
or inﬂuenced policy;
Understanding the governance and
accountability arrangements and
organisational forms and structures put
in place through devolution, how they
interact with existing arrangements, and
how they work in practice;
Following the changes to services as they
develop – seeking to understand planned
changes and their underlying logic model
and then to map and measure their
implementation and impact on service
metrics and health outcomes.
1 2 3
A1. Qualitative research methodology
Our qualitative research was mainly focused on the research
objectives 1 and 2 above, though we sought to gather
information on objective 3 as it started to become available
particularly during the latter part of the project.  Fieldwork
commenced in December 2015 and concluded in September
2017.   We adopted a range of qualitative research methods to
address the research questions. Data collection was principally
undertaken by two researchers who became familiar to those
involved in the devolution process. They observed meetings,
which enabled the researchers to follow the development of
devolution and decision-making processes in situ, taking
contemporaneous ﬁeldnotes on both the content and process of
meetings, using the recording format shown in ﬁgure A1.  Notes
were typed up as soon as possible following meetings where
they were expanded on and relevant details/ ﬁgures from
meeting observations and available papers were added. They
also conducted semi-structured interviews with some key
informants, which explored a series of thematic issues in greater
depth.Topic guides were adapted according to the type of
organisation (e.g. provider, commissioner) and their relevant
geography and included prompts to help make connections to
issues raised in meeting observations. Interviews involved open
questions to avoid leading questions and participants were
welcomed to shape the discussion raising topics which they felt
were signiﬁcant. In addition, we collated policy documents, reports,
minutes and papers for meetings and observed various devolution
events, conferences, seminars and other associated forums. 
In accordance with the requirements of our ethics approval, all
interviewees were approached before interview to explain the
purpose of the research, and given a participant information
sheet and the opportunity to ask any questions and to decline to
be interviewed.  The voluntary nature of participation and the
conﬁdentiality arrangements for the storage, analysis and use of
interview data were made clear.  Before interview, participants
received and signed a consent form.   For the observation of
meetings which were not public events, the chair of the meeting
informed meeting participants in advance of the researcher’s
attendance and at the beginnings of meetings that the
researchers were presents and would be observing the meeting,
and the researchers were given the opportunity to introduce
themselves and the research project as appropriate. On some
occasions, participants felt that the matters to be discussed in
meetings were not suitable for research observation, and the
researchers would then leave for speciﬁed parts of the meeting
as directed.  There were a number of meetings which, for the
same reason, researchers were requested not to attend. 
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Meeting: Title of meeting
Date/time: Date/time 
Location: Location and room of meeting
Attendees: Record of who was attending the meeting (including late arrivals/early departures)
Pre-meeting 
observations: 
Notes of any key developments/issues arising and general observations were taken whilst awaiting the
main meeting to begin. This may include reﬂections on the atmosphere in the room, layout and so forth as
well any points of signiﬁcance in terms of content of discussion, for example, provision of hand-out or
unresolved issues at a previous meeting.
Body of meeting: This was principally structured around meeting agendas, including opening comments, absences and the
main body of matters addressed. Here, the content of meeting discussions and key quotations recorded
and the researchers’ initial reﬂections documented. For example, where certain issues progressively
gained signiﬁcance over a sequence of meetings, the researchers would record this, observing how key
points of interest were expressed and reacted to by members present. Signiﬁcant details or analytical
points were ﬂagged and marked in bold text when typing up notes following meetings. On occasion,
meeting formats diﬀered, for instance a guest speaker or discussion session and note taking format was
adjusted accordingly whilst capturing both content and meeting dynamics.
Immediate reﬂections/
key issues: 
Overall analytical reﬂections from the meeting were noted at the end in bullet point form and elaborated on
in more depth when typing up meeting notes afterward
Figure A1.   Meeting observation ﬁeldnotes recording format
During the ﬁeldwork, we observed 164 meetings and events
totalling approximately 343 hours. we undertook 50 interviews
which varied in length from 30 to 120 minutes.  Most interviews
took place in participants’ oﬃces or similar quiet locations, 
though some were conducted by telephone, at the convenience
of research participants.  A sample outline interview schedule is
given in ﬁgure A2 – this version was for interviewees from NHS
providers and similar schedules were developed for other groups.
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Figure A2.   Interview schedule – provider template 
Opening discussion/refresher of research aim/objectives, ethics, anonymity etc.
• [General opener] How are things going? 
• What is/are your role(s)? How become involved in devolution? 
• In way of a general overview, can you say what you think is going particularly well and what is perhaps more challenging?
• What are you working on? What meetings attend?
• What inﬂuence are providers having under devolution?
• In what ways are relationships changing between FTs under devolution?
• How are things going with ‘Transformation Theme 3’ work in re-conﬁguring acute services?
• There has been discussion of moving towards system wide control totals, how is system-based working aﬀecting Trusts? 
• What about beyond the Greater Manchester STP ‘footprint’?
• Can you describe the links with Transformation Theme 2 – Local Care Organisations and community-based care and how 
that is developing? 
• More broadly, what involvement do you and your organisation have in relation to your locality work and on-going changes? 
How is it changing? 
• And the Transformation Fund? How is this working as a process?
• How is transformation aﬀecting relationships between providers and commissioners? 
• How have things changed with the Partnership Team? Changing?
• And what about relationships with diﬀerent national bodies?  
• What role of sectors now? (…Healthier Together…)
• Where is learning/critique taking place in the system? 
• So overall, what are your reﬂections of the devolution process to date?
• Any concerns or uncertainties that we should consider?
Note – this topic guide is abridged, and topic prompts are not included
The research was ethnographic in nature. Researchers were
closely embedded within the policy process, often travelling to
and from meetings with senior managers and holding many
conversations outside the settings of formal meetings and
interviews. This approach helped us to capture the attitudes,
beliefs and what might be described as the ‘textures’ of changing
relationships among participants and to examine the process as
events unfolded, rather than retrospectively. 
All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Meeting observations were written in ﬁeld notebooks following
the format detailed in Figure A1 and typed up as soon as possible
following meetings. Relevant supplementary material from
meeting papers which was referenced in meeting observations
were incorporated into the expanded typed up meeting
observation materials. These were saved on a password
protected university shared space before being added to a data
management programme (NVivo).  Data was coded and analysed
within the NVivo package.. An initial basic coding framework was
developed by the two main qualitative researchers based on
anticipated themes and added to through inductive coding. The
coding framework was subsequently reﬁned and grouped into
parent and child thematic codes (diﬀerent levels) by the lead
qualitative researcher. Emerging analytical ﬁndings were
discussed and expanded on in analytical ‘memos’ within NVivo.
Analysis and emerging themes were discussed by the team in
fortnightly meetings as well as through additional meetings held
throughout the process by the main qualitative researchers.
Speciﬁc analysis sessions based on analytical memos were
undertaken by the team. Themes featured in the report were
discussed and agreed by the team collectively.  The team met
periodically with representatives of the GM Partnership to
discuss and test out emerging ﬁndings throughout the research
process as well as holding advisory group and roundtable events
which included a series of experts and stakeholders. The
presentation of the report reﬂects ﬁndings from data collection
and analysis. 
A2. Quantitative research methodology
Our quantitative research was mainly focused on research
objective 3 set out in the introduction to this appendix – seeking
to understand planned changes and their underlying logic model
and then to map and measure their implementation and impact
on service metrics and health outcomes.  Locality investment
agreements detail the projected beneﬁts of policies
implemented using money from the Transformation Fund. The
ex-ante quantitative element of the research comprised two
components examining the accuracy of two important
assumptions commonly made in locality investment
agreements: the proportionality of reductions in attendances at
accident & emergency (A&E) departments and reductions in the
volume on non-elective admissions; and the degree to which
reductions in the volume of admissions translate into cost
savings.  More detail on these assumptions and a summary of
data and methods used to test them are provided below. 
The proportionality of changes in the volume of 
A&E attendances and non-elective admissions
Hospital departments providing emergency care are facing
unprecedented pressures. Recent evidence suggests that over-
crowding is caused by a combination of demand-side and
supply-side factors. Following the devolution of health and social
care powers to Greater Manchester in April 2015, plans have
been developed to reduce demand for emergency care by
shifting care from hospital to the community. Locality
investment agreements often assumed that non-elective
admissions fall proportionately with reductions in attendances
and emergency departments.
We examine how demand pressure and bed occupancy impacts
care decisions in emergency departments using national data on
attendances at Type 1 A&E departments (those with a
consultant led 24 hour service) in England. 
We use data on attendances occurring between 1st April 2015
and 31st March 2016 at 132 English Type 1 A&E departments,
sourced from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), supplemented
with data from HES inpatient records for the same ﬁnancial year.
We took a random 10% subsample of the full sample for
computational ease, generating a sample size of 1,308,203
observations.
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We create a measure of A&E demand pressure for each individual
attendance based on the number of other patients attending the
same A&E department during the period in which the individual
may be expected to be in A&E. To ensure that the measure is
exogenous, we assume that all patients are in A&E for a 4-hour
period, as this is the maximum time a patient is expected to
spend in A&E. Patients whose stays overlap with any individual’s
attendance, and are thus competing for the same A&E
resources, are therefore those attending in the 3 hours
preceding and the 3 hours following this individual’s hour of
attendance. To adjust for seasonal and daily variation, we
measure demand as the deviation in volume from its
expectation, formed by the A&E department’s experience in
time variation in the volume of attendances in 2014/15. 
We measure bed occupancy using data on admission and
discharge dates from HES inpatient records. Unlike arrival time at
A&E, time of admission and discharge are only available in days
and so bed occupancy can only be measured at a daily frequency.
The bed occupancy measure for each individual attendance is
constructed as the number of inpatients in the provider in the
day prior to attendance relative to the maximum daily number 
of inpatients being treated in the same provider over all days
in that year, the latter serving as a proxy for the full capacity of
the provider.
We estimated the associations between A&E demand pressure,
bed occupancy and numerous methods of patient disposal using
multinomial logistic regression. We deﬁne patient disposal as
having four distinct categories: (1) admitted; (2) discharged with
no follow-up; (3) referral or transfer to other care services; and
(4) left without treatment. We control for patient demographics
and severity, indicators of the date and time of attendance, and
hospital ﬁxed eﬀects. The lack of a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of demand pressure on the probability of admission provides
evidence for the proportionality of changes in the volume of A&E
attendances and non-elective admissions.
A limitation of this approach is potential bias due to time-varying
unobserved case-mix. Previous studies examining eﬀects of
overcrowding have exploited data from A&E vital signs
assessments, but this data is not available in HES. If these
measures are correlated both with care decisions and demand
pressure, then the impact of demand pressure on the probability
of admission will be biased. However, availability of such
measures relies on a complete assessment taking place and as a
result this data may not have been collected for patients leaving
without being seen, meaning they could not have been included
as covariates in our analysis even if data was available. In
addition, by controlling for a range of observed measures of
case-mix, we ensure that any bias is likely to be small. A ﬁnal
limitation is that by controlling for changes in case-mix we are
examining the eﬀects of demand pressure, holding the type of
patient constant. If interventions implemented as a result of
devolution act to change the case-mix and severity of patients
attending A&E, the relationship between changes in the volume
of A&E attendances and non-elective admissions observed in
reality may diﬀer from those predicted here.
The relationship between the volume of admissions and unit costs
Reducing expenditure by reducing the volume of hospital
services is a key aim for devolution of health and social care in
Greater Manchester. Projections on the cost savings from
reduced hospital admissions made in locality investment
agreements initially assume that total costs will fall
proportionally with volume. This implicitly assumes that unit-
costs are invariant to changes in the volume of admission. 
However, economies of scale suggest that higher levels of
volume mean that ﬁxed overhead costs can be spread over
higher levels of output, therefore reducing the unit cost. Higher
levels of volume may also reduce variable and semi-variable
costs through increases in operational eﬃciency. A subset of
localities account for this by applying “cashability” assumptions,
which adjust projections by assuming only a % of volume
reductions translate into reductions in expenditure. However,
little empirical evidence is available on which to base these
assumptions.
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The aim of this study is to examine elasticity of unit costs with
respect to changes in the volume of admissions, and examine
whether this elasticity varies by type of admissions.
We obtained data on volumes and unit costs from annual Trust
Reference Cost returns. Reference costs provide annual, Trust-
speciﬁc, per-spell treatment costs by Healthcare Resource
Group (HRG) and admission method (elective, emergency and
daycase admissions). We also used data from Hospital Episode
Statistics (HES) over the ﬁnancial years of 2010/11 until
2015/16. From these data, we constructed suspected drivers of
unit cost including age, sex, morbidity, and length of stay. 
Reference costs and HES data were merged based on Trust-
admission-HRG-year. The HRGs used in the reference costs are
HRG version 4+ whereas the HES data include HRG version 4. In
the 2015/16 ﬁnancial year, only 15% of HRGs in HES were
matched to HRGs in Reference Costs. For this reason, we
decided to estimate models without cost drivers as the main
analysis and account for cost drivers as sensitivity analysis.
We estimated the relationship between cost and volume,
controlling for covariates, hospital-HRG ﬁxed eﬀects and year
ﬁxed eﬀects. We took the logarithm of volume and costs, such
that the cost coeﬃcient represents the estimate of elasticity. An
elasticity of zero indicates that units cost are invariant to
changes in volume.
We ran the analyses separately for the following types of
admission: (1) All emergency, electives and day cases; (2) All
emergency & electives; (3) Only electives; (4) Only emergency;
and (5) Only day cases.
We tested the robustness of the results to small numbers by
limiting the analysis to HRG-hospital combinations which had
more than 5, 10 and 20 observations for all HRG-provider-
ﬁnancial years.
A limitation of this approach is the potential of bias due to time-
varying unobserved case-mix. If unobserved case-mix is
correlated both with both unit costs and the volume of
admission, then elasticity estimates will be biased. This threat is
more serious in speciﬁcations in which potential cost-drivers are
not controlled for. In addition, as elasticities estimated in
speciﬁcations including potential cost-drivers are restricted to
only a subset of HRGs, these elasticities may not reﬂect
observed elasticities over all HRGs. This limits their use in
predicting cost changes occurring due to volume reductions
resulting from devolution.
A brief outline of the ex-post evaluation of health & social care
devolution
The overall aim of the ex-post evaluation is to examine the
impact of health and social care devolution to Greater
Manchester on population health, healthcare activity and
expenditure, health system performance, and wider public
sector outcomes.
This aim is supported by 3 main objectives.
1. To assess whether devolution led to average improvements 
in outcomes.
2. To assess whether devolution led to reductions in 
income-related outcome inequalities.
3. To assess whether devolution led to reductions in the variation
in outcomes across providers and/or geographical areas.
In examining average improvements in outcomes, our empirical
strategy aims to identify whether changes in health and social
care outcomes in Greater Manchester after the implementation
of devolution have been caused by devolution or have emerged
either as a result of a continuation of pre-existing trends or due
to nationwide policy changes occurring independently of
devolution. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) methods will
primarily be used for this purpose, and broadly involve a
comparison of changes in outcomes in Greater Manchester to
those in equivalent areas in the rest of England. However,
unbiased DiD estimates of policy eﬀects requires the validity of
the parallel trends assumption, which stipulates that, in the
absence of the introduction of devolution, outcome trends in the
post-devolution period in Greater Manchester would be parallel
to those in the rest of England. The selection of appropriate
methods is therefore guided by graphical and regression-based
tests of the parallel trends assumption. If the assumption holds,
DiD methods are used. If the assumption fails, we utilise lagged
dependent variable regression, an alternative method which a
recent microsimulation study has been found to be optimal in the
event of divergent outcome trends. Objectives 2 and 3 will be
tested by examining whether policy eﬀects vary by the level of
outcome and deprivation levels measured at the area/provider-
level in the time period prior to devolution.
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The initial set of outcome metrics was derived through a detailed
examination of the GM Strategic plan and subsequent
programme plans, frequent discussions with individuals from
within the Partnership, and an investigation of available datasets
to ensure metrics are available nationwide and collected at a
suﬃcient frequency. These outcomes were then supplemented
with outcomes typically used to track health system and public
sector performance.
Potential impacts on diﬀerent outcomes are likely to emerge at
diﬀerent time points, based on when devolution-induced policies
to improve each outcome are implemented, diﬀerential lags to
when these policies are likely to be eﬀective, and the delay to
outcome data becoming available. The ex-post evaluation is
therefore separated into a short-term and long-term evaluation.
The short-term evaluation is funded by the Health Foundation
until March 31st 2019, and focuses on outcomes relating to
healthcare activity and expenditure, eﬃciency and quality of
care, and carer and care-user quality of life and self-care, which
have been the focus of many locality Transformation Fund
applications and the subject of short-term targets for outcome
improvements in the GM Strategic Plan. Results from this
evaluation are planned to be published in Summer 2019.
The long-term evaluation is conditional on securing additional
funding and is planned to run until September 31st 2022. It has
four main objectives. The ﬁrst is to broaden the set of metrics
used to measure health system performance, by examining
impacts on measures of patient and staﬀ experience and
indicators of the quality and eﬃciency of mental health services.
The second is to examine long-term impacts on outcomes
examined in the short-term evaluation, recognising that such a
large policy scale change may have eﬀects which are either
delayed or change over time. The third objective is to study the
drivers of outcome change, for example by examining impacts
on the healthcare workforce and the organisation of primary and
secondary care. Finally, the evaluation will be broadened to
examine impacts on population health and wider public sector
outcomes linked to the GM Population Plan, supplemented with
outcomes typically used to track population health. Results from
this evaluation will be published in Winter 2022, although interim
reports may be published periodically. 
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